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Article 
Immigrant Remittances 
EZRA ROSSER 
Remittances, the sending of money from immigrants back to their home 
countries, are the newest anti-poverty, development activity of the poor to 
be applauded by international institutions and economists. Exceeding 
foreign aid and private investment to many developing countries, 
remittances are being hailed as a new, untapped resource with powerful 
poverty alleviation and potential development attributes.  After presenting 
the poverty, developmental, and economic characteristics of this new 
transnational connection between immigrants and their loved ones, as well 
as the dangerous effects of excessive remittance regulation, this Article 
argues that remittances should be understood as an anti-poverty tool, but 
not as a route to development. 
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Immigrant Remittances 
EZRA ROSSER ∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The global poor can solve the problem of poverty.  So long as the right 
institutions are in place, poverty can be eradicated through development 
insights from the third world.  This is the message of three economic ideas 
and activities—micro-lending, land-titling, and remittances—that have 
captured the imagination of international institutions and policy makers.  
These three economic phenomena share many attractive features, from 
their bottom-up global origins to their reliance on capitalist mechanisms to 
their ability to empower the poor, but driving their popularity in the West 
is the selfish hope that global poverty can be dealt with costlessly.   
This Article focuses on remittances—“the money that migrants send 
home to their families”1—for their own sake and as a window on the 
incorporation of economic ideas by Western societies (explored at the end 
of this Article through law and development literature).  Remittance 
transfers globally exceeded $230 billion in 2005, perhaps by as much as 
fifty percent if all informal remittances were counted.2  In some recipient 
                                                                                                                          
∗ Assistant Professor, American University Washington College of Law.  Thanks to Raquel 
Aldana, Daniel Bradlow, Angela P. Harris, Heather Hughes, Kevin R. Johnson, Fernanda Nicola, Nina 
Pillard, Alvaro Santos, Daniel Sokol, David Snyder, Jason Solomon and faculty participants at a 
Georgetown University Law Center faculty workshop, the 2007 Southeastern Association of Law 
Schools’ Annual Meeting, the 2007 annual summer legal conference at the University of Gloucester, 
U.K., the 2007 Clasco-Crop Conference at the Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, Ecuador, a seminar 
presentation at the Universidad del Pacifico, Peru, the 2006 International Migration Conference at the 
Universidad Centroamericana, El Salvador, and the 2007 Poverty Law Symposium at American 
University Washington College of Law for helpful comments. 
1 Paul Wolfowitz, Foreword to WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006: ECONOMIC 
IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION, at vii (2006) [hereinafter WORLD BANK].  But see 
José de Luna Martínez, Workers’ Remittances to Developing Countries: A Survey with Central Banks 
on Selected Public Policy Issues 7, n.3 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3638, 2005) 
(“There is no universally accepted definition of remittances.”).  This Article focuses on a single 
remittance type, worker remittances; other remittance types are beyond the scope of this Article.   
2 MANUEL OROZCO ET AL., CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, CARD-BASED REMITTANCES: A 
CLOSER LOOK AT SUPPLY AND DEMAND 3 (2007), available at  http://www.cfsinnovation.com/ 
document/card_based_remittances.pdf.  As the World Bank reports, “[r]emittances transferred through 
informal operators or hand carried by travelers are unlikely to be captured in official statistics, although 
they may represent a substantial addition to remittances sent through official channels.”  WORLD 
BANK, supra note 1, at 91; accord BIMAL GHOSH, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, MIGRANTS’ 
REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: MYTHS, RHETORIC, AND REALITIES 15 (2006), available at 
http://www.antigone.gr/listpage/selected_publications/eu/071127.pdf (noting that actual remittances to 
developing countries far exceed amount officially recorded).   
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countries, remittances “can account for as much as a third of GDP.”3  
Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean “exceed, by substantial 
margins, such other flows [of capital] as portfolio investment, foreign aid, 
and government and private borrowing.”4  These vast sums have elevated 
remittances to near celebrity status in the last ten years.5  Leading 
economists, international development organizations,6 and even the 
popular press7 have all jumped on the remittance bandwagon.  Yet the 
crucial questions—whether to increase or decrease regulation, whether to 
attempt to direct the use and benefits of remittances or remittance flows, 
and whether remittances are a development tool—remain unanswered.   
In this Article, I argue that remittance transaction barriers ought to be 
lowered but that remittance sending and receiving countries should not 
focus their “third world” development goals on this phenomenon.  Though 
the legal community has yet to expressly tackle remittances, existing 
institutions and rules shape the scale and significance of remittance flows.  
Though rarely forced to acknowledge the contradiction inherent in 
                                                                                                                          
3 COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS, WORLD BANK, GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR 
INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCE SERVICES 1 (2007), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss76. 
pdf?noframes=1.    
4 INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, MAKING THE MOST OF FAMILY REMITTANCES: SECOND REPORT 
OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE TASK FORCE ON REMITTANCES 3 (2007), available at 
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/family_remittances.pdf.     
5 As a World Bank report begins, “[a] booming interest in the topic of workers’ remittances has 
developed over the past few years on the part of academics, donors, international financial institutions, 
commercial banks, money transfer operators, microfinance institutions, and policy makers.”  Guillermo 
Perry, Foreword to PABLO FAJNZYLBER & J. HUMBERTO LÓPEZ, CLOSE TO HOME: THE DEVELOPMENT 
IMPACT OF REMITTANCES IN LATIN AMERICA, at v (2007), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/INTLACOFFICEOFCE/Resources/ClosetoHome.pdf [hereinafter CLOSE TO HOME]; see 
also Samuel Munzele Maimbo & Dilip Ratha, Remittances: An Overview, in WORLD BANK, 
REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 1, 3 (Samuel Munzele Maimbo & 
Dilip Ratha eds., 2005) [hereinafter REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS] 
(noting the “recent revival in interest in migrant remittances”); Susan Pozo, On Remittances and Risk, 
in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: MAKING MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 71, 72 (Donald F. Terry & 
Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005) (noting that “until recently, policymakers and researchers have paid little 
attention to international remittances”).  For overviews of remittance scholarship, see Eve Hamilton, 
The State of Remittance Research: An Overview, in INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, INTER-AMERICAN 
DIALOGUE CONFERENCE REPORT: RESEARCH ON REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA AND THE 
CARIBBEAN 10–18 (2007), available at http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/Conference 
%20Report,%20Research%20on%20Remittances%20to%20LAC%20FINAL.pdf, and DOVELYN 
RANNVEIG AGUNIAS, MIGRATION POLICY INST., REMITTANCES AND DEVELOPMENT: TRENDS, 
IMPACTS, AND POLICY OPTIONS: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2006), available at http://www. 
migrationpolicy.org/pubs/mig_dev_lit_review_091406.pdf. 
6 For example, in the past two years “the flagship publications of the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Bank, and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) have all addressed the 
growing importance of migration and remittances and their impact on development efforts.”  CLOSE TO 
HOME, supra note 5, at 1.       
7 See, e.g., Rory Carroll, Emigrants from Latin America Sent Home £32bn Lifeline: Record Sum 
Dwarfs Foreign Direct Investment and Aid, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Mar. 19, 2007, at 24; Jason 
DeParle, A Good Provider Is One Who Leaves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 50 
(noting the attention now being directed at remittances); The Importance of Remittances, ECONOMIST, 
July 31, 2004 (noting that in 2006 remittances “exceeded the combined flow of aid and foreign direct 
investment” to Latin America).      
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formally closed borders and look-the-other-way economic reliance upon 
undocumented workers, remittances attest to both the porous nature of our 
borders and the perpetually subordinate position of many remittance-
sending immigrants.  Poor workers’ ability to care for loved ones with 
money earned in developed countries creates families that transcend 
national borders.  Celebratory or permissive stances towards remittances 
indict our immigration policy by drawing attention to the contrast between 
officially closed borders when it comes to labor and open borders when it 
comes to capital flow, even when earned by those thought of as “illegal 
aliens.”   
With remittances no longer relegated to the “errors and omissions 
columns in international financial reports,”8 the rules that give shape to the 
remittance phenomenon can be tweaked in a way that improves on their 
power to reduce poverty in recipient countries.  But, supporting and 
exposing remittance benefits does not diminish the significance of the 
challenges of a globalized market in a world of great inequality across 
countries.  As is true of microcredit and land-titling, remittances need to be 
understood as an anti-poverty tool, not as a development tool.  
Remittances, though perhaps buying time, do not excuse governments and 
institutions in the developing or developed world from their shared 
responsibility to meet the challenge of inadequate and unequal growth 
dynamics.  Remittances, albeit generated through personal sacrifice, can 
alleviate some of the hardships families face because of a lack of local 
opportunities in their home countries.  Ultimately, while remittances are 
“hot” in development circles, remittances are by their very nature better 
suited to reducing poverty than fuelling lasting development.9   
My argument proceeds in three stages.  In Part II of this Article, I 
present an in depth description of remittances in terms of their impact on 
poverty, consumption, and national development.  Such a detailed 
description, though somewhat at odds with the broad theoretical structure 
of typical law review articles, is a requisite for my later critique of 
remittances as a development tool.  Furthermore, given that this is the first 
                                                                                                                          
8 MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, SENDING MONEY HOME: 
LEVERAGING THE DEVELOPMENT IMPACT OF REMITTANCES 1 (2006), available at http://idbdocs.iadb. 
org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=823579.  
9 Recipient country awareness of the power of remittances preceded the current attention being 
given remittances by international development organizations and sender countries.  And given the 
fickle nature of popular and intellectual attention, and the way discussion is disproportionately driven 
by the gaze of developed countries, recipient countries will no doubt be dedicated to remittance issues 
long after the current general remittance emphasis has dissipated.   
Though development experts are paying attention, scholars in other areas of the law have not yet 
focused on the phenomenon.  Remittances should not be so relegated; rather, as Professor Lucy A. 
Williams argues regarding anti-poverty advocates, an identifier I would self-embrace, there is a need to 
explore connections between areas of law in order to “provide a fuller picture of legal structures that 
perpetuate poverty.”  Lucy Williams, Towards an Emerging International Poverty Law, in 
INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW: AN EMERGING DISCOURSE 1, 12 (Lucy Williams ed., 2006).    
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law review article on remittances, a fully descriptive presentation of 
remittances is valuable in and of itself as an introduction of the 
phenomenon to the legal community.  Though remittances have been 
important throughout human history and such transfers are a global 
practice, Part II uses the recent remittance experience of Latin America 
and, in particular, of one country, El Salvador, as a case study.10  In Part 
III, I shift my focus to the regulatory and tax-based policy challenges that 
threaten to hem in future remittance transfers.  As such, Part III is part 
description and part argument regarding the importance of low transactions 
and regulatory costs.  In Part IV, I critique the “institutionalization” of 
remittances and remittance dialogue by Western institutions.  My 
conclusion—that the love demonstrated by transnational families ought to 
inform remittance and development policy—requires the injection of a 
degree of realism regarding the role remittances play in recipient countries.  
A sound international policy on remittances is one that does not use 
paternalistic and instinctively critical observations regarding the downsides 
of remittances to limit them, but instead requires that we stop thinking of 
remittances as a phenomenon to be manipulated like other development 
tools.   
II.  SCALE, IMPACT, AND ECONOMICS OF REMITTANCES 
In the week before Christmas, paired lines—separated by vast 
distances and national borders—form at money transfer companies and in 
the offices of banks whose Spanish names reflect their Latin American 
roots.  Just north of Washington, D.C., along University Boulevard in 
Silver Spring, Maryland and next to the “La Union Mall,” named for a 
Salvadoran town in the heart of D.C.’s Salvadoran immigrant 
community,11 hermanos lejanos (the Salvadoran name for Salvadoran 
expatriates, literally “far away brother”) line up at Banco Cuscatlan to 
transact the only sort of business possible at that branch: they send money 
                                                                                                                          
10 El Salvador is not a random choice; rather it is a country with a rich remittance experience.  
Remittances represent a significant fraction of El Salvador’s GDP (see Part II.A) and many families in 
the country rely upon remittances, making “the Salvadoran economy . . . highly dependent on 
remittances.”  Jessica Sabine et al., Remittances and Human Development: The Case of El Salvador 6 
(Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Working Paper No. 2005/1) (emphasis omitted), available 
at http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/925MGSoGWorkingpaper2005-1.pdf; accord 
Congressional Research Services, Central America and the Dominican Republic in the Context of the 
Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) with the United States 35 (CRS Report No. RL32322, Oct. 24, 
2005) available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/57870.pdf.   
Finally, the choice to focus on El Salvador is personal: I am married to a Salvadoran.  I first 
became interested in this topic when I realized that a vast gulf existed between Salvadoran knowledge 
and experience with remittances and that of most Americans, even highly educated ones, who have 
trouble even defining “remittances.”  
11 For more on Washington, D.C.’s Salvadoran immigration, see Terry A. Repak, Labor 
Recruitment and the Lure of the Capital: Central American Migrants in Washington, D.C., 8 GENDER 
& SOC. 507 (1994) (focusing on gendered aspect of migration to D.C.).         
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to their relatives living in El Salvador.12  Thousands of miles south, lines 
extend to the sidewalk outside remittance dispersal locations; in Usulután, 
El Salvador, people of all ages crowd into Western Union’s downtown 
storefront, fighting their way to the counter to collect money sent only 
hours before by their U.S.-based relatives.13  And while remittance activity 
reaches a crescendo before Christmas and other holidays, such as Mother’s 
Day,14 remittances play a significant role for hermanos lejanos, the family 
members they support, and Latin American countries year round.   
A.  Remittance Growth and Scale 
According to the president of the Inter-American Dialogue, “it is hard 
to exaggerate” the importance of remittances on Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and remittances are perhaps “Latin America’s most important 
resource.”15  This significance is becoming recognized not simply because 
the international glance has turned to them, but because the scale and 
growth of remittances has made these “dynamic flows of money” stand 
out.16  Latin America, and the Caribbean countries in particular, feel the 
effects of remittances; they are “at the top of the ranking . . . of 
remittances-receiving regions,” in the aggregate and on a per capita basis.17  
U.S. Latino immigrants send “upwards of $50 billion a year” to their home 
countries.18  This $50 billion reflects a tenfold increase in remittances to 
Latin America in real terms over the last two decades.19  Extending the 
                                                                                                                          
12 Banco Cuscatlan is one of many options; Western Union is located in the same shopping center 
and not far away there are other Salvadoran banks.   
13 The crowd at the Western Union can disrupt traffic traveling along the Pan-American Highway 
through Usulután.  
14 See Krissah Williams, To Latina Mothers, With Love: A Refrigerator From America, WASH. 
POST, May 10, 2007, at D1 (reporting that Mother’s Day—which occurs a few days prior to the U.S. 
holiday—is “one of the biggest gift-giving holidays” for Latinos and that “Western Union says money 
transfers are spiking”).   
15 Peter Hakim, Preface to INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, ALL IN THE FAMILY: LATIN AMERICA’S 
MOST IMPORTANT INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL FLOW: REPORT OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE 
TASK FORCE ON REMITTANCES 1 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.iadialogue.org/publications/ 
country_studies/remittances/all_family.pdf.   
16 OROZCO ET AL., supra note 2, at 3.  But see Ester Hernandez & Susan Bibler Coutin, Remitting 
Subjects: Migrants, Money and States, 35 ECON. AND SOC’Y 185, 189 (2006) (questioning the 1990s 
reported remittance growth by asking “whether the amount of money transferred actually increased or 
whether reforms simply permitted banks to record a larger percentage of these transactions”).      
17 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 2; accord OROZCO ET AL., supra note 2, at 4 (“The 
relationship between Latin America and the U.S. constitutes the highest volume remittance market in 
the world.”).   
18 INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 3.  This paper focuses on South-North migration 
and remittance flows, but it should be noted that remittances also are important in South-South 
migration.  For more on such remittances, see Dilip Ratha & William Shaw, South-South Migration 
and Remittances (World Bank, Working Paper No. 102, 2007), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:2
1154867~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html. 
19 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 1.  Given the split between documented, measured flows and 
informal methods of sending remittances, it can be hard to separate the increase in counted remittance 
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time frame expands the remittance increase multiplier to more than twenty 
times the level of remittance sending to Latin America in 1980.20  The 
growth in remittances to the region is replicated in El Salvador’s 
impressively expanding remittance receipts, now accounting for fifteen to 
eighteen percent of the country’s GDP.21  Officially counted remittances—
a count which does not include remittances sent through informal 
channels—to El Salvador more than doubled from 1999 to 2007, with 
remittances increasing from $1.4 billion to $3.7 billion.22    
Driving the growth in the size of the U.S. remittance market to Latin 
America is U.S. Latino population growth.23  “Immigrants in the U.S. 
represent a large and growing market for financial institutions,”24 and “[a]s 
the immigrant population has grown, the volume of remittances has 
increased dramatically.”25  Latin American migrants in the United States 
almost doubled between 1990 and 2000, from 8.6 million to about 16 
million.26  The number of Salvadorans living in the United States by the 
tail end of a nearly decade long civil war in El Salvador was 565,081 in 
1990, but by 2004 had nearly tripled to 1,449,051.27  Latino in-migration is 
                                                                                                                          
increases into increases due to more money actually being sent and increases due to better measurement 
of flows or the prior flows now entering formal channels.  See Dilip Ratha, Leveraging Remittances for 
Development, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. POL’Y BRIEF, June 2007, at 1–2, available at 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/MigDevPB_062507.pdf (discussing the differences between the 
measured amount of remittances and the true amount).    
20 Pablo Acosta et al., Remittances and Development in Latin America, 29 WORLD ECON. 957, 
958 (2006).  
21 Given the undocumented nature of some remittance transfers, estimates of the GDP percentage 
share of remittances naturally vary slightly depending on the study and source, but the fifteen to 
eighteen percent share seems to be a standard accepted range.  See Ricardo Hausmann & Dani Rodrik, 
Self-Discovery in a Development Strategy for El Salvador, 6 ECONOMIA: J. LATIN AM. & CARIBBEAN 
ECON. ASS’N 43, 70 (Fall 2005) (fifteen percent of GDP on average from 2000 to 2004); CLOSE TO 
HOME, supra note 5, at 4 (seventeen percent of GDP in 2004); INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra 
note 4, at 5 (eighteen percent of GDP in 2005).    
22 Banco Central de Reserva de El Salvador, http://www.bcr.gob.sv/estadisticas/se_remesas.html.   
23 Though the discussion that follows emphasizes that more immigrants equals increased 
remittances, the relationship between remittances and migration is not necessarily unidirectional; 
remittances can help people “remain in their home country . . . discourag[ing] future immigration.”  Eli 
Coffino, Note, A Long Road to Residency: The Legal History of Salvadoran & Guatemalan 
Immigration to the United States with a Focus on NACARA, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 177, 206 
(2006).  
24 Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Banking on Remittances: Increasing Market Efficiencies for 
Consumers and Financial Institutions 33 (July 11, 2005) (emphasis added) (paper presented at Federal 
Reserve System Community Affairs Research Conference: Promises and Pitfalls: As Consumer 
Finance Options Multiply, Who is Being Served and at What Cost?, Apr. 2005), available at 
http://www.chicagofed.org/cedric/files/2005_conf_paper_session3_hogarth.pdf.  
25 Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 2  (2002) (opening statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, 
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking Housing and Urban Affairs), available at http://frwebgate. 
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_senate_hearings&docid=f:86402.pdf.   
26 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 10. 
27 PROGRAMA DE NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, PNUD, EL SALVADOR, INFORME 
SOBRE DESARROLLO HUMANO EL SALVADOR: UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS, EL IMPACTO DE 
LAS MIGRACIONES ch. 2, figs. 2.1 & 2.2 (2005) [hereinafter UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS], 
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part of the general global trend the World Bank observed of accelerated 
migration to high-income countries, a trend that may even increase.28  
“Pull” factors generated in developed countries have great explanatory 
power regarding macro trends in migration levels.29  Additionally, societal 
out-migration—fueled by a civil war,30 natural disasters,31 and limited 
economic opportunities32—has helped create a Salvadoran transnational 
community for which remittances are an important part of the relationship 
between expatriates and their relatives back home in El Salvador.33  
Moreover, the expansive growth of Salvadoran migration arguably reflects 
the government of El Salvador’s role “in encouraging and managing the 
flows of people and remittances.”34  Whether reflecting war, natural 
disasters, relative economic opportunities, or simply over-population of the 
country (El Salvador is the most densely populated country in Central 
America),35 explosive migration to the United States has helped increase 
the demand for, and use of, remittance services.36   
                                                                                                                          
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/latinamericathecaribbean/elsalvador/el_ 
salvador_2005_sp.pdf.    
28 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 26–29.   
29 See, e.g., Mary De Ming Fan, Disciplining Criminal Justice: The Peril Amid the Promise of 
Numbers, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 40 (2007) (noting that migration increases “when economic 
times are good and jobs are plentiful in the United States and ebb when the economy weakens and job 
availability slackens”); Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, 
Unequal, and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (crediting the U.S. 
economy’s “demand for millions of essential workers” with luring immigrants to the country).   
30 See, e.g., Palma Torrisi, Salvadorans’ Remittances as Unique Consequences: The Place for 
Salvadorans’ Remittances in the Determination of the Extreme Hardship Requirement of the 
Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act, 9 TOURO INT’L L. REV. 87, 89 (2001) (“The 
violence which characterized the civil war, in which one of every hundred Salvadorans was killed (they 
were mostly civilians and were often tortured), coincided with the massive outflow of one of every six 
Salvadorans to the United States.”).   
31 Id. at 139 (citing as examples Hurricane Mitch and three earthquakes in 2001).  The damaging 
effects of the 2001 earthquakes include loss of life, destruction of housing, and infrastructural damage.  
Pan American Health Organization, Earthquakes in El Salvador, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL BULL., Mar. 
2001, at 1, available at http://www.paho.org/english/sha/be_v22n1-cover.htm.   
32 Sabine et al., supra note 10, at 2.   
33 Manuel Orozco explains, “[t]he economic context of a typical family with bi-national or 
transnational obligations include sending of remittances, keeping in touch through telephone or visits 
home or from relatives, buying home country goods, or property.”  MANUEL OROZCO, THE 
SALVADORAN DIASPORA: REMITTANCES, TRANSNATIONALISM AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES, 2 
(2004).  There are non-familial remittances, “collective transfers, for instance through a hometown 
association, usually directed towards a collective beneficiary,” but the bulk of remittances “are the 
classical intra-family transfers that are usually associated with the word remittances.”  Jørgen Carling, 
Policy Options for Increasing the Benefits of Remittances 7 (Univ. of Oxford Ctr. on Migration, Policy 
& Soc’y, Working Paper No. 8, 2004), available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/ 
papers/WP0408.pdf.   
34 Sarah Gammage, Exporting People and Recruiting Remittances: A Development Strategy for 
El Salvador 11 (May 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
35 LET’S GO CENTRAL AMERICA 252 (Benjamin Krutzinna ed., 9th ed. 2004).   
36 According to a 2002 report, forty-seven percent of Latino remitters have arrived in the United 
States over the last ten years, a statistic that emphasizes the importance of recent immigration on 
remittance growth.  Dulce C. Benavides, The Pew Hispanic Center/Kaiser Family Foundation National 
Survey of Latinos: A Demographic Portrait of Latino Remittance Senders in the United States, in 
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Given the amount of money entering Latin America, it is important to 
consider the linked ways, beyond scale alone, that remittances impact Latin 
American countries: (1) consumption and poverty reduction, and (2) 
macro-economic effects and long-term national development.  While these 
particular issues will be treated separately, their connectedness should not 
be forgotten.  Remittances existed prior to their current popularization; 
they simply were “hidden in plain view,” relegated to the “errors and 
omissions columns in international financial reports.”37  Bringing out the 
importance of remittances is an ongoing process and, thus, requires a note 
about figures and conclusions.  Much is now known about remittances, but 
the recent flurry of research, programs,38 and interest in remittances cannot 
disguise the fact that this is a nascent, and consequently very fluid, area of 
research.39   
As the paired Washington and Usulután lines illustrate, remittance 
transfers are a consequence of transnational families.  Mr. Remittances, 
Manuel Orozco,40 defines a transnational family as “a unit with household 
members across borders that stay in regular contact to maintain their bonds 
and responsibilities.”41  Though their sacrifices are not often noted, such 
family bonds persist in the face of the many challenges of separation, 
distance, and often poverty within both the United States and Latin 
American parts of the family.  “At the simplest level, remittances reflect 
the profound emotional bonds and constant interaction,” Roberto Suro 
                                                                                                                          
BILLIONS IN MOTION: LATINO IMMIGRANTS, REMITTANCES AND BANKING 19 (2002), available at  
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/13.pdf.  Yet, “[e]ven though, the money flow drops off among 
those with longer tenure, a substantial proportion of immigrants (23 percent) who have been away from 
home for 20 to 30 years still send money back to their relatives.”  ROBERTO SURO, MULTILATERAL 
INVESTMENT FUND & PEW HISPANIC CTR., REMITTANCE SENDERS AND RECEIVERS: TRACKING THE 
TRANSNATIONAL CHANNELS 5–6 (2003), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/23.pdf.     
37 MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, supra note 8, at 1.    
38 See e.g., Earth Inst. at Columbia Univ. Ctr. on Globalization & Sustainable Dev., Program on 
Remittances and Development, http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/cgsd/remittances/index.html 
(last visited July 13, 2008) (program at Columbia University); Ctr. for Int’l Dev. at Harvard, 
Remittances and Migration, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/remittances/index.html (last visited July 13, 
2008) (five research projects at Harvard University); Inter-American Dialogue: Remittance Project, 
available at  http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=80. 
39 See WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xi (noting that “basic data on migration and remittances are 
lacking, so predicting the impact of policy changes can be problematic”); Richard H. Adams, Jr. & 
John Page, Do International Migration and Remittances Reduce Poverty in Developing Countries?, 33 
WORLD DEV. 1645, 1660 (2005) (arguing that “more accurate data” is needed on unofficial remittance 
flows); Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 193 (noting the unreliability of calculating 
remittances).       
40 Title used by Peter Hakim, President of the Inter-American Dialogue, to introduce Manuel 
Orozco at the release of the Second Report of the Inter-American Dialogue’s Task Force on 
Remittances, Dirksen Senate Office Building, May 1, 2007.   
41 MANUEL OROZCO, TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES: LIVES ON THE EDGE BUT IN PURSUIT OF 
CHANGE 2 (2006), available at http://www.remittances.eu/component/option,com_docman/task,doc_ 
download/gid,27/ (last visited July 13, 2008). 
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explains, “between relatives separated by geography and borders.”42  
Academic over-conceptualization of the choices made by migrants and 
households in developing countries43 risks hiding, even diminishing, the 
hard work and love that underlie remittance sending.44  Many remittance-
sending migrants have braved long distances, la migra, and cultural loss, 
and intellectualizing these often painful decisions can lead to failure to 
understand the sacrifices involved.45  Generally speaking, remittances have 
a simple explanation: “Workers leave their home countries for higher paid 
jobs abroad and, through a combination of hard work and thrift, send a 
portion of their earnings back home to support their families.”46   
B.  Consumption and Poverty Reduction 
Remittances are, in many respects, a form of consumption by each 
remitting immigrant, albeit consumption of a particular sort.  Immigrants 
spend eighty-five percent of their money in the United States, with the 
                                                                                                                          
42 Roberto Suro, A Survey of Remittance Senders and Receivers, in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: 
MAKING MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 21, 22 (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005).  
43 See, e.g., Mariano Sana & Douglas S. Massey, Household Composition, Family Migration, and 
Community Context: Migrant Remittances in Four Countries, 86 SOC. SCI. Q. 509, 510 (2005) 
(emphasizing that “an implicit or explicit contractual arrangement between the family and the migrant” 
is a “necessary condition” for migration according to the new economics of labor migration).   
44 See Ezra Rosser, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 12 
(highlighting love as the foremost aspect of remittances and transnational families); Torrisi, supra note 
30, at 127 (defining remittances as monies sent by “ the alien” to “loved ones left behind in the alien’s 
country of origin”); see also MULTILATERAL INV. FUND, INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, REMITTANCES 
2005: TRANSFORMING LABOR MARKETS AND PROMOTING FINANCIAL DEMOCRACY, STATISTICAL 
COMPARISONS 2 (2005), available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx? 
docnum=639199 (“[T]he driving force behind [remittances] remains a fundamentally human 
connection: a commitment to family values lies at the core of these flows.”).  Ester Hernandez and 
Susan Bibler Coutin critique the focus on the connection between love and remittances as overlooking 
the labor underlying remittances.  Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 190.  Yet while 
Hernandez and Bibler Coutin are right to note that immigrants earn their money through hard work, the 
choice to send that money to family members reflects love.   
45 Sana and Massey break the familial decision to migrate and remit into two possible 
explanations, the first focused on risk diversification and the search for investment capital, and the 
second “based on need,” defined as being less carefully planned and aimed to ensure family subsistence 
when home country opportunities are lacking.  Sana & Massey, supra note 43, at 512.  Inadequate or 
wrong information can distort both the first and second categories identified by Sana and Massey by, 
for example, falsely glorifying the job opportunities in the destination country.  See WORLD BANK, 
supra note 1, at 61 (highlighting the effect distance and language differences can have on migrants’ 
knowledge, potentially lessened by diasporas already established in origin countries).  But see GORDON 
H. HANSON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 12 
(2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/ImmigrationCSR26.pdf 
(noting the “responsiveness of illegal immigration to [actual] economic conditions”).      
46 Donald F. Terry, Remittances as a Development Tool, in BEYOND SMALL CHANGE: MAKING 
MIGRANT REMITTANCES COUNT 3, 4 (Donald F. Terry & Steven R. Wilson eds., 2005); see also 
WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 35 (presenting the choices of a fictional couple contemplating their 
household income in their home country versus their income if one member migrates to a higher 
income country).  Risk diversification, in addition to high/low-income country wage differentials, may 
provide additional migration incentive.  Id. at 59.   
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remaining fifteen percent of their earnings sent to their country of origin.47 
Remittances are typically “earmarked to assist with specific household 
expenses.”48  Initially, such a split in local versus distant purchases may 
seem to make remittance purchases categorically distinct from 
“consumption.”  Yet, perhaps tellingly, in The Economic Consequences of 
the Peace, John Maynard Keynes described the privilege of the 
Englishman who felt it “normal” that he could purchase goods from all 
over the world.49  Currently, immigrant purchases of goods—through 
remittances—for their household members still living in their homeland 
are accomplished through their family as agents and are not seen as 
“normal.”  Nevertheless, to the extent that consumption is the end result, 
the Englishman’s (and implicitly the average American’s) purchases are in 
many ways analogous to those of the Salvadoran immigrant.50   
The fact that the Salvadoran’s family members do not live in the same 
house should not necessarily force a definitional re-characterization of 
remittances as a “gift” rather than a purchase.51  For while in American law 
there is a preoccupation with the household as the unit of analysis,52 is 
there really a qualitative difference between an Englishman purchasing 
school books for his child and a Salvadoran doing the same simply because 
the Salvadoran’s purchase is accomplished through an aunt or uncle acting 
as his agent?  Just as spending on education positively impacts the 
performance of children of non-immigrants in the United States, so too can 
Salvadorans sending remittances expect improved educational achievement 
by their family members.53   
1.  Remittance Purchases  
An argument remains that despite similar goals, there is a fundamental 
difference in “remittance” and “normal” purchases, namely that remittance 
                                                                                                                          
47 Manuel Orozco & Nancy Castillo, Latino Migrants: A Profile on Remittances, Finances, and 
Health 6 (2008) (on file with Connecticut Law Review). 
48 JERONIMO CORTINA & RODOLFO DE LA GARZA, TOMÁS RIVERA POLICY INSTITUTE, 
IMMIGRANT REMITTING BEHAVIOR AND ITS DEVELOPMENTAL CONSEQUENCES FOR MEXICO AND EL 
SALVADOR 1 (2004).   
49 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PEACE 11–12 (1920).  
50 As Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin explain: “Remittances are part of a broader 
circulation of money and, in some cases, are very much like regular expenses that individuals assume 
(e.g. the upkeep of one’s home, the maintenance of one’s family members), with the key difference 
that, given the dispersal of household members, payments cross national boundaries.”  Hernandez & 
Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 195.   
51 But see id. at 194 (describing remittances as “products and gifts”).   
52 For a recent example, see Robert C. Ellickson, Unpacking the Household: Informal Property 
Rights Around the Hearth, 116 YALE L.J. 226, 229 (2006).   
53 Alejandra Cox Edwards & Manuelita Ureta, International Migration, Remittances, and 
Schooling: Evidence from El Salvador, 72 J. OF DEV. ECON. 429 (2003) (finding that remittances have 
a positive impact on schooling, especially in rural areas); Ratha, supra note 19, at 6 (“Studies based on 
household surveys in El Salvador . . . find that children of remittance-receiving households have a 
lower school dropout ratio and that these households spend more on private tuition for their children.”).   
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purchases require an agent.54  After all, whereas the Englishman or the 
American goes directly to Tesco or Wal-mart respectively, usually a family 
member of the Salvadoran migrant collects the remitted money and then 
makes the household purchases.  That the purchases occur through an 
agent and in a separate country can affect incentives to work and the cost 
of goods in the recipient country,55 but family member reliability 
minimizes the need to consider the traditional agency concern that the 
agent will not follow desires of the principal.  Surveys of remittance 
senders and recipients asking senders why they sent money and asking 
recipients how they actually spent the remittance attest to the 
trustworthiness of recipients.  As Orozco explains, there is “very little 
dissonance between what the senders think they are sending aid for and 
what their relatives said they are spending it on.”56  For those migrants 
concerned relatives will not put their money to the use preferred, migrants 
in bigger cities can pick particular products out of catalogues or store 
displays, and relatives can then pick up the goods at traditional stores in El 
Salvador.57   
Remittance senders are “primarily motivated to contribute to family 
maintenance” of those still in their home country,58 and, accordingly, most 
of the money sent is “used for basic needs, such as food, medicine and 
shelter.”59  There is no single bundle of goods purchased with remittances 
that holds across all countries or years, but looking at how remittances are 
spent in two countries can provide a snapshot of remittance use:60  
                                                                                                                          
54 Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 197 (“[T]he benefits that remittances may 
provide to poor families may be undermined by a ‘moral hazard problem’ created by the distance 
between remitters and recipients.”).   
55 See infra notes 118–28 and accompanying text.   
56 OROZCO, supra note 41, at 1, 8 (reporting on the results of a survey of twenty-two families).   
57 Indeed, one such company, Unicomer, has a showroom within the Salvadoran consulate’s 
office complex in Houston.  Jenalia Moreno, Store Makes Long-Distance Gifts Easy: Customers Order 
Items for Delivery to Their Relatives in Latin America, HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 20, 2006, at 1 
(Business); see, e.g., Deborah Belgum, Special Delivery: Company Helps Immigrants Care for 
Relatives Back Home by Providing U.S. Outlet for Buying Appliances That Can Be Received Across 
Border, L.A. BUS. J., Oct. 7, 2002, at 21 (allowing immigrants to select items from a catalog for 
delivery to their families in Mexico); de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 29 (“[E]ven some retail stores 
in El Salvador offer migrants the option to purchase goods that are delivered to their relatives in their 
home countries.”); Derek Reveron, La Curacao Cashes In, ADWEEK’S MARKETING MEDIOS, May 1, 
2006, http://www.marketingymedios.com/marketingymedios/magazine/article_display.jsp?vnu_content 
_id=1002425665 (affording immigrants the opportunity to build credit histories).   
58 CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 21; see also Torrisi, supra note 30, at 104 (“The 
alien subjectively believes that, without her continued remittances, her family in the homeland will 
suffer acute economic hardship . . . .”).     
59 Krissah Williams, Immigrants Sending $45 Billion Home, WASH. POST, Oct. 19, 2006, at A9.   
60 Table based upon CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 28 tbl.6 (based upon 2003 
figures, numbers rounding explains deviation from one-hundred percent).   
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With food and basic consumption amounting to over two-thirds of 
remittance use in Mexico and El Salvador, one might think that it would be 
easy to claim that remittances have a net positive impact on poverty and 
inequality in recipient countries.  For, while migrants also send remittances 
to buy land or for special events that fall outside of narrow understandings 
of “need,” such as weddings or quinceañeras,61 it seems almost 
definitional—more money is flowing in—that remittances lower the 
poverty rate in recipient countries.62  To the question, “do remittances 
reduce inequality and poverty?” a World Bank report on Latin American 
remittances notes, “[i]n theory, given that in many cases remittances go to 
poor households and that remittances directly increase these households’ 
level of income, an unequivocally positive answer could be expected.”63   
2.  Remittances’ Impact on Poverty 
Given the conclusion of the last paragraph, it is probably not surprising 
that the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality is less than 
straightforward.  After noting that “very little attention has been paid to 
analyzing the poverty impact of these financial transfers on developing 
countries,” a recent study on global migration and remittances tentatively 
concluded, “on average, a 10% increase in per capita official remittances 
will lead to a 3.5% decline in the share of people living in poverty.”64  
                                                                                                                          
61 Mariano Sana, Buying Membership in the Transnational Community: Migrant Remittances, 
Social Status and Assimilation, 24 POPULATION RES. & POL’Y REV. 231, 239 (2005) (“Community 
rituals such as weddings, baptisms or funerals offer ideal venues for migrants to display spending 
power, claim status, and have it valorized.  Migrants pay for rounds of drinks and multiple expenses 
tied to local festivities, including musicians’ fees.  Together with gifts packed in heavy suitcases, 
migrants use these spending displays to assert their success in the United States.”).    
62 After all, “the flow of familial remittances necessarily increases GDP per capita of those who 
receive them, clearly making them better off.”  CORTINA & DE LA GARZA, supra note 48, at 33.  
63 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 12.   
64 Adams, Jr. & Page, supra note 39, at 1645, 1660.  But see CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 
15–16 (arguing that the Adams & Page study is “likely to underestimate the poverty effects of 
remittances” and fails to highlight variation across countries).    
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While “[r]emittances are not a panacea for poverty reduction,”65 they do 
play an important role, albeit one that is highly contextual and varies 
across countries.66 
Poverty reduction findings are reassuring for those who emphasize the 
importance of remittances.  It appears migrants are managing to send 
sufficiently high remittances to make up for their losses of income 
associated with local jobs held prior to departing their home country.67  
Drawing attention to the scale of remittances alone, without 
acknowledging the loss in income from work done prior to migration, risks 
exaggerating the impact of remittances.68  A recent study found that forty-
four percent of remittance senders had a full-time job before coming to the 
United States.69  In some instances, remittance effects should be discounted 
by loss of pre-emigration income; yet, some situations call for an approach 
that does not consider loss in pre-migration income when doing so is 
inappropriate given the cause of the migration.  In such circumstances, 
migration is “treated as exogenously given.”70  Arguably, Salvadoran 
migration motivated (necessitated?) by the civil war falls into this 
migration category, in which case remittance effects should not be lessened 
by pre-migration wages.        
Looking at El Salvador’s experience reveals both the tremendous 
promises and potential pitfalls of a poverty-centered approach to 
understanding remittances.  First, a note on terms, from economist Jeffrey 
Sachs: 
Extreme poverty, defined by the World Bank as getting 
by on an income of less than $1 a day, means that households 
cannot meet basic needs for survival. . . . Moderate poverty, 
defined as living on $1 to $2 a day, refers to conditions in 
                                                                                                                          
65 INT’L DEV. COMM., HOUSE OF COMMONS, MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT: HOW TO MAKE 
MIGRATION WORK FOR POVERTY REDUCTION, 2003-4, H.C. 79-I, at 61 [hereinafter HOUSE OF 
COMMONS], available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmselect/cmintdev/ 
79/79.pdf. 
66 Given migrant population differences along education, class, and opportunity lines, as well as 
differing recipient-country characteristics, the impact of remittances on poverty and inequality is highly 
country-specific.  WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 91 (“One of the challenges of understanding 
remittance flows is that their characteristics, costs, and channels vary widely from one bilateral corridor 
to another (and also widely from different locations within each country).”).   
67 But see Hernán Rozemberg, Drawback to Money Sent to Mexico?, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-
NEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, at 5B (suggesting that some immigrants from rural parts of Mexico earn more 
prior to emigrating to the United States).      
68 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 14; Ratha, supra note 19, at 5.   
69 INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, PUBLIC OPINION 
RESEARCH STUDY OF LATIN AMERICAN REMITTANCE SENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 12 (2006), 
available at http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=826095 [hereinafter PUBLIC 
OPINION RESEARCH STUDY].   
70 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 118.   
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which basic needs are met, but just barely.71      
Remittances have cut extreme poverty in three countries—Mexico, the 
Dominican Republic, and El Salvador—by more than thirty-five percent 
and moderate poverty by an average of nineteen percent, according to a 
World Bank estimate.72  Furthermore, El Salvador’s “progressively 
distributed . . . remittances are associated with significant reductions in 
both inequality and poverty.”73   
For a country where between twelve and eighteen percent of the 
population still lives in extreme poverty (depending on whether you use a 
nationally defined line or a U.S. $1/day line),74 these poverty and 
inequality reduction figures attributable to remittances are striking.  El 
Salvador is still recovering from its long civil war which lasted twelve 
years (1980–1992) and retarded economic growth.  The country has yet to 
reach pre-civil war per capita levels; the World Bank estimates that, if the 
current growth trend continues, the economy will take until 2015 to reach 
the country’s 1978 levels.75  And while the period immediately following 
the war was marked by a faster growth rate and saw poverty reduced by 
twelve percent,76 since 1995, the growth rate under post-Cristiani 
presidents has fallen.77  For the Salvadoran poor, remittances in some 
respects made up for the economic slowdown.  It was remittances, not 
economic growth or other pro-poor development policies of the 
government, that instigated gains in progressive income distribution and in 
equaling reduction after 1995.78   
The welfare-improving effect of remittances is strikingly overlooked 
through a narrow focus on poverty headcount figures alone.  Most Central 
American recipients are using remittances primarily to meet their basic 
food needs and, therefore, still need additional income in order to meet 
other necessities.79  This fact suggests that rather than remittances being 
properly subject to critique for not being tied to a greater percentage 
decrease in poverty, remittances should be seen as a very effective 
                                                                                                                          
71 Jeffrey D. Sachs, The End of Poverty, TIME, Mar.14, 2005, at 42.   
72 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 13.   
73 Id. at 15.  The report notes a Salvadoran Gini coefficient equality improvement of 2.1% driven 
by remittances.  Id. at 13.    
74 PROGRAMA DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA EL DESARROLLO, PNUD, EL SALVADOR, 
CUADERNOS SOBRE DESARROLLO HUMANO 16 tbl.2 (May 2007), available at http://www.pnud. 
org.sv/2007/content/view/27/83?id_publ=74 (follow hyperlink to pdf document).    
75 WORLD BANK, REPUBLIC OF EL SALVADOR COUNTRY ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM 12 (2003) 
(Background Studies Report No. 26238) [hereinafter EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM].     
76 Id.  
77 Alfredo Cristiani was the El Salvadoran president who signed the country’s peace agreements 
on behalf of the government.  UNA MIRADA AL NUEVO NOSOTROS, supra note 27, at ch. 3 fig.3.2; see 
EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 18 (noting a decline of economic growth 
from 11% to 1.5% during the 1990s).   
78 EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 13–16.   
79 OROZCO, supra note 41, at 2.    
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mechanism for reaching migrant family members in need.  This is true 
whether the need is ongoing—income support to meet basic food needs—
or the result of an adverse income or welfare shock.  Remittances not only 
raise recipient consumption levels, they “may play a significant role in 
smoothing consumption.”80  For example, remittances rose in the wake of 
devastating hurricanes that hit Central America.81  Such increases are not 
temporary guilt-based gifts, but an increase that can be tracked over the 
five year period following hurricanes.82  Finally, even where the shock is 
purely economic, there is the strong possibility that remittances are 
counter-cyclical, providing additional resources when the home country’s 
economy is not doing as well.83  In addition to disaster response, counter-
cyclical sending further demonstrates that remittances provide both for 
necessary items, such as basic food, and invaluable recipient income-
smoothing.   
Remittances are typically a very personal—family member to family 
member—exchange.  However, collective remittances, primarily through 
hometown associations, can also help lessen the effects of poverty, 
primarily, but not exclusively, through economic development projects.  
Collective remittances, defined as “groups’ initiatives to finance and carry 
out projects to benefit their communities of origin,”84 to Latin America are 
predominantly channeled through hometown associations (HTA).  “[T]he 
hometown association has a long and familiar history,” Orozco explains.85  
“[The HTA] draws together people from the same town or state in the 
migrant-sending country, enabling them to retain a sense of community as 
they adjust to the United States.”86  Participation in hometown associations 
is “a way [for immigrants] to validate their identity,”87 and, perhaps, help 
ensure social standing in their home community.88  Hometown associations 
do everything from organizing social events in the United States, to 
helping maintain North-South connections between members of a 
particular town, to sending collectively raised money and resources to their 
                                                                                                                          
80 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 122.  
81 Ratha, supra note 19, at 3.   
82 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 123 (“In cross-country data, a dollar’s worth of hurricane 
damage leads to roughly $0.13 in additional remittances in the year of the hurricane and $0.28 cents 
over five years.”).   
83 Ratha, supra note 19, at 3.   
84 Luin Goldring, Re-Thinking Remittances: Social and Political Dimensions of Individual and 
Collective Remittances 6 (York Univ. Ctr. for Research on Latin Am. and the Caribbean, Working 
Paper Series, 2003).   
85 Id. 
86 Manuel Orozco, Latino Hometown Associations as Agents of Development in Latin America, in 
SENDING MONEY HOME: HISPANIC REMITTANCES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 85, 87 (Rodolfo 
O. de la Garza & Briant Lindsay Lowell eds., 2002).       
87 Manuel Orozco, Central American Diasporas and Hometown Associations, in DIASPORAS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 215, 221 (Barbara J. Merz et al. eds., 2007).   
88 Sana, supra note 61, at 239.   
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town of origin for infrastructure and poverty-reduction projects.89   
The paired impact of migration and hometown associations is 
strikingly evident in El Salvador’s Intipuca City.90  Intipuqueños, 
Salvadoran migrants from Intipuca, maintain a strong connection with their 
native city.  Intipuca—with signs primarily in English and a more elaborate 
infrastructure than other similarly sized towns—is full of reminders that, 
while the war led to a massive migration to the Washington, D.C. area, 
many Intipuqueños still consider Intipuca home.91  The city reflects both 
familial remittances—allowing a level of housing construction quality that 
is unusual for such a rural town—and collective efforts of the United 
Committee for Intipuca, which, together with matching funds from the 
Salvadoran government, has helped build projects such as stadium fields 
and septic systems.92  Indeed, in El Salvador, Intipuca is sometimes called 
either “city of dollars” or “gringo city.”93  What remains true for HTAs, as 
well as for familial remittances, is that “although remittances to families 
and donations to communities are channeled primarily to the poor, these 
resources alone do not constitute a solution to the structural constraints of 
poverty.”94  The transnational Intipuca City community reflects 
tremendous efforts on the part of the home and migrant populations and is 
not simply the product of an infusion of money.95  Collective remittances 
impact poverty, and, by bringing migrants together, might do so in ways 
that traditional remittances may not.  Moreover, collective remittances 
reflect the connection that hermanos lejanos have not only to the family 
members they left behind but also to their communities.          
Understanding the impact of remittances on poverty requires 
                                                                                                                          
89 See Rafael Alarcón, The Development of Hometown Associations in the United States and the 
Use of Social Remittances in Mexico, in SENDING MONEY HOME: HISPANIC REMITTANCES AND 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 101, 108–12 (Rodolfo O. de la Garza & Briant Lindsay Lowell eds., 
2002) (detailing the HTA range of activities and the many ways HTA target matters that particularly 
affect the poor in origin country hometowns).     
90 See, e.g., Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 199 (reporting that their “interviewees 
marvelled at the town of Intipucá, which has become known as a modern, highly Americanized 
community supported almost entirely by remittances”).   
91 The Intipuca City’s unofficial website, www.intipucacity.com, is a catalogue of stories of 
hermanos lejanos who have done well in the United States but still feel a close connection with their 
city of origin.   
92 Orozco, supra note 86, at 92.   
93 David Pedersen, The Storm We Call Dollars: Determining Value and Belief in El Salvador and 
the United States, 17 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 431, 433 (2002) (also identifying “town of thieves” 
as a third name given to the city following the collapse of Banquito, an unofficial remittance transfer 
operation and bank).   
94 Manuel Orozco & Katherine Welle, Hometown Associations and Development: A Look at 
Ownership, Sustainability, Correspondence, and Replicability, in NEW PATTERNS FOR MEXICO 157, 
157 (Barbara J. Merz ed., 2005).  
95 These efforts are driven by the requirements of self-identity and should not be reduced by the 
diminutive label “nostalgia.”  As Professor Anupam Chander writes, “[a]t times hope—and at other 
times fear—compels many people to leave their homeland and settle abroad.  But leaving home does 
not necessarily eliminate one’s regard for that land or its people.” Anupam Chander, Diaspora Bonds, 
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1098 (2001). 
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considering the relative class position of both recipients and senders.  In 
testimony before the Senate regarding remittances, Illinois Congressman 
Luis Gutierrez captured the income-smoothing and consumption aspects of 
remittances but did so from the standpoint of migrants: “These are hard-
working people, doing the hardest jobs, the longest hours, for the worst 
pay.  And what they are doing is helping their family members back in 
their countries of origin, many times in moments of crisis.”96  At the same 
committee hearing, Former Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes noted in his 
introduction that the “[p]eople sending remittances tend to be low-wage 
earners with modest formal education.”97  According to a recent survey of 
remittance senders, “more than three-fifths of remittance senders can be 
considered ‘working poor’ or ‘lower middle class’ with annual incomes of 
less than $30,000,” and at least thirty-five percent of remittance senders 
have a household income under $20,000.98   
To understand why the United States is still considered a land of 
opportunity for many Central American migrants, the salaries received in 
the United States must be placed in context.  According to the same survey 
noted above, “[t]he average salary of the—first job of Latin American 
immigrants in the U.S. was $900 a month—six times the amount they were 
earning in their country.”99  Thus, two things seemingly in conflict are true.  
The first truth is that, ultimately, both senders and recipients are families 
living on the edge of poverty.100  The second is that remittance senders are 
able to send money back to their home country because they make 
tremendous sacrifices for their family members.101  Additionally, being 
poor in the United States and being poor in Latin America does not mean 
the same thing.  This sentence risks being misread, so it is worth 
clarification.  I do not mean to diminish the hardships involved in being 
                                                                                                                          
96 Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, 
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. 4 (2002) (statement of Rep. Luis V. Guiterrez) [hereinafter 
Hearing]; see also For Love or Money?, ECONOMIST, May 20, 1995, at 78 (“[A] migrant worker, 
struggling to make ends meet in a foreign country, sends a big slice of his pay packet back to his 
homeland.”).   
97 Hearing, supra note 96, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman, S. Comm. 
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).  In fact, migrant education level and remittance sending are 
negatively correlated: “the higher the education level of migrants relative to the population in their 
home countries, the lower the amount of money sent home.”  Yoko Niimi & Çağlar Özden, Migration 
and Remittances: Causes and Linkages 10 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4087, 
2006).  
98 PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH STUDY, supra note 69, at 3, 9.  Remittance senders from Central 
America are also young, with over half aged 18 to 34.  Id. at 6.  Manuel Orozco puts the percentage 
earning less than $20,000 at “[a]bout half of both men and women.”  OROZCO, supra note 41, at 3.  
99 PUBLIC OPINION RESEARCH STUDY, supra note 69, at 11.     
100 Torrisi, supra note 30, at 133.  
101 Writing about Salvadoran immigrants living on Long Island and sending money back to El 
Salvador, Professor Sarah Mahler observes, “Salvadorans make sacrifices.  Sometimes they deprive 
themselves of comforts . . . . The strain can be overwhelming . . . .”  SARAH J. MAHLER, SALVADORANS 
IN SUBURBIA: SYMBIOSIS AND CONFLICT 104 (1995).   
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poor in the United States, nor do I wish to suggest, as the Heritage 
Foundation has, that the U.S. poor are not poor.102  Yet, if remittance 
senders were suffering under absolute poverty of the sort captured by the 
World Bank’s definitions of “extreme” or “moderate” poverty, remittance 
senders would not have money to send back to their family members who 
did not migrate with them.  This does not mean they are not struggling, but 
it does demonstrate the inspiring commitment that remittance senders—
prioritizing sending their money over paying their own bills—have to their 
family members.103   
C.  Macro Effects and National Development 
Remittances impact not only recipient families but also, in the 
aggregate, have important and potentially negative consequences for the 
economies of remittance-receiving countries.  While the sacrifices of 
immigrants and those left behind when an immigrant leaves make it 
inappropriate to characterize remittances as a “windfall” to recipient 
families, at the national level remittances arguably are a form of 
“unearned” national income. This has possible positive and negative 
consequences for recipient-countries.  In this Part, the impact of rational 
remittance windfalls will be explored along three central economic 
avenues: (1) pricing of goods, (2) bank and national borrowing, and (3) 
work incentives.   
Remittances can distort the pricing of even the most basic goods and 
can lead to inefficient remittance-driven, rather than growth-driven, use of 
resources.  Additionally, remittances can exacerbate problematic class 
dynamics, creating a division between those who are poor and do not 
receive remittances and those who are remittance recipients.  Even a 
seemingly unambiguously positive consequence of large remittance 
flows—the ability of local banks and recipient countries to get cheaper 
loans through the securitization of remittance flows—must be examined 
closely.  Positively, thousands of small transfers can reduce the national 
cost of capital, which in turn can help with both debt payments and with 
economic development.  But, despite the fact such securitization is driven 
by the assets (the predictable and substantial flow of money) of the people, 
la gente, and not of wealthy elites, there is the danger that international 
                                                                                                                          
102 See, e.g., Robert Rector & Kirk A. Johnson, Understanding Poverty in America, 
BACKGROUNDER: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.), Jan. 5, 2004 (noting 
that material hardship—lack of food, housing, and clothing—does exist in the United States, but that “it 
is quite restricted in scope and severity”).  
103 Three-fourths of remittance senders in one recent survey reported so ordering their finances.  
Suro, supra note 42, at 25.  As one participant in Suro’s survey reported, “Before anything, I send them 
the money because they count on it . . . . Then afterwards I pay my bills, my rent, but the first thing I do 
is send it.”  Id.; accord Torrisi, supra note 30, at 134 (noting that remittances “exacerbate [senders] 
own household economic problems”).   
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banks and local elites will succeed in capturing the value associated with 
the securitization based reduced cost of capital.  Remittances can reduce 
the incentive of recipient families to work, leading to remittance 
dependence and harming national growth.  Finally, while remittances 
typically are sent family member to family member, collective remittances 
can fund home country improvement and development that would not take 
place without such hermano lejano support.     
1.  Price of Goods 
Sudden riches can create many problems for an economy, and 
remittance-driven gains are no exception.  Remittances are foreign-earned 
money that can raise the cost of goods in the recipient-country.  The 
recipient country has not increased production, yet there is more money in 
circulation owing to the remittances; hence, prices rise.  If the nation-state 
is seen in isolation, then such price increases owe themselves not to any 
improvement in the economy, but to an exogenous—arguably false—
increase in purchasing power.104  Recipient economies flush with 
remittance money become vulnerable both to inflation, particularly 
harmful to those not receiving remittances, and, through labor reduction, to 
falling exports as the economy reacts to the increased remittances.  It is 
consequently clear that countries ignore at their own peril the economic 
challenges inherent when an economy is injected with extra capital 
divorced from national production.   
The export and price effects of remittances can be illustrated through 
El Salvador’s remittance experience.  Following the 1992 peace agreement 
that ended the country’s civil war, El Salvador experienced a period of 
rapid growth.  The high consumption that marked the period “was to some 
extent facilitated and reinforced by the massive inflow of workers’ 
remittances.”  Yet, these remittances were also “associated with an 
expansion of the money supply, higher domestic credit and high inflation 
until 1995.”105  Dollarization of the Salvadoran economy linked their 
                                                                                                                          
104 As is the case with sudden natural resource wealth (discoveries of gold or oil), “‘Dutch 
disease’s effects of remittances . . . [are] likely to be large in small economies.”  Ratha, supra note 19, 
at 7.  Furthermore, remittances generally are unlike many other exogenous shifts in that they tend to 
“grow gradually over long periods,” thus reducing Dutch disease effects.  WORLD BANK, supra note 1, 
at 86. 
105 EL SALVADOR ECONOMIC MEMORANDUM, supra note 75, at 12.  While El Salvador 
experienced higher domestic credit and inflation, even purely consumptive use of remittances “may 
stimulate development, especially if [remittances] are spent locally.”  Outward Bound—Emigration, 
ECONOMIST, Sep. 28, 2002, (Special Report), at 1.  Consumptive remittance use will have a multiplier 
effect on the economy when it makes up for “insufficient demand” in the economy.  WORLD BANK, 
supra note 1, at 124.  Consumption driven commercial development often surprises visitors to San 
Salvador who are unprepared for the wealth on display in several of the newer shopping centers.  The 
newest and most extravagant, La Gran Via and Multiplaza, opened in 2005, complete with extensive 
marble floors and upscale restaurants, and they join Galerias, a mall built around an existing mansion, 
as the high-end shopping centers.  Tourists need to be mindful that “capital accumulation diverted to 
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inflation to our own,106 but, arguably, remittances have played a role in 
reducing the international competitiveness of traditional agricultural 
exports.107  With the receipt of remittances, rural Salvadoran families can 
choose not to work on large coffee and sugar fincas (large 
farms/plantations), forcing finca owners to rely upon Honduran immigrant 
labor.108  Prices for goods also rise through remittance receipts.  
Dramatically, towns far removed from the capital city are able to support 
Western fast-food restaurants such as Pizza Hut, but less dramatically, 
remittance-backed demand can push up the costs of even basic supplies 
and food items.109  For a country which only recently began to implement a 
very limited welfare system for the truly needy,110 to the extent that 
remittances do not have a trickle-down effect, those who do not receive 
remittances are harmed by their relative worsening position compared to 
remittance-receiving families.111   
                                                                                                                          
build ostentatious cities may lead to incorrect economic analyses in comparisons of the wealth of 
cities.”  PAUL BAIROCH, ECONOMICS AND WORLD HISTORY: MYTHS AND PARADOXES 108 (1993).       
106 El Salvador’s transition from a local currency to U.S. dollars was facilitated by remittance-
receipts which provided needed hard currency for the switch to a dollar economy.  See El Salvador: 
Dollars and Debts, ECONOMIST, Apr. 8, 2000 (noting the hurdles of transitioning from local currency 
to U.S. dollars).  For more on El Salvador’s adoption of the dollar, see El Salvador Learns to Love the 
Greenback, ECONOMIST, Sep. 28, 2002.   
107 Remittances, by facilitating stronger bonds between hermanos lejanos and their family still 
living in El Salvador, may however simultaneously play a role in creating a new export market in 
“nostalgic goods.”  The Role of Remittances in Leveraging Sustainable Development in Latin America 
and the Caribbean:   Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, 
Trade and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services,  110th Cong. (2007) (statement of 
Manuel Orozco), available at http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ 
htorozco030707.pdf (testimony presented on March 6, 2007).  The sale of such goods, whether in the 
form of Fernando Llort prints, artwork from La Palma, or La Alianza soccer jerseys, is on the rise and 
is another reminder of the continued importance hermanos lejanos give the country they left behind.    
108 Sarah Gammage, El Salvador: Despite End to Civil War, Emigration Continues, COUNTRY 
PROFILES, July 2007, http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=636; WORLD 
BANK, PROSPECTS, SOUTH-SOUTH MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES, http://econ.worldbank.org 
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPECTS/0,,contentMDK:21154867~pagePK:6416540
1~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00.html (follow hyperlink “(1) Bilateral Migration Matrix”).  
109 Luis Rene Caceres & Nolvia N. Saca, What do Remittances Do?  Analyzing the Private 
Remittance Transmission Mechanism in El Salvador (IMF, Working Paper, 2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2006/wp06250.pdf.  
110 El Salvador’s welfare program, Red Solidaria, was established in March 2005.  CAROLINA 
ÁVALOS & CECILIA GALLARDO, SECRETARÍA TÉCNICA DE LA PRESIDENCIA, PROGRAMA RED 
SOLIDARIA, PROGRAMA SOCIAL DE ATENCIÓN INTEGRAL A LAS FAMILIAS EN EXTREMA POBREZA DE EL 
SALVADOR: DOCUMENTO TÉCNICO RED SOLIDARIA, app. 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.redsolidaria.gob.sv/especiales/cd/ (follow “documento” hyperlink).  For more on Red 
Solidaria, see Tatiana Britto, Conceptual and Operational Features of El Salvador’s CCT Program 
(United Nations Development Program, Working Paper Powerpoint, 2007), available at 
http://www.undp-povertycentre.org/paper-seminar/MissionTatiana.pdf.      
111 The remittance-receipt split in purchasing power is most dramatically evident in the classified 
ads for housing published by both La Prensa Grafica and Diario Del Hoy, both of which regularly 
feature numerous ads targeted explicitly at remittance-receiving families or at visiting hermanos 
lejanos seeking to provide for their parents or other family who they came to El Salvador to visit.  
Remittances “benefit particular households and communities which receive remittances, and—unless 
they generate significant multiplier effects—may lead to heightened inequality between remittance–
rich and remittance–poor households.”  HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 61.  
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2.  Bank and National Borrowing 
For remittance-receiving countries, remittances are primarily a 
personal matter between senders and recipient families.  However, by 
treating the predictable flow of remittances as an asset,112 recipient country 
banks and governments can leverage remittances as collateral, reducing the 
cost of borrowing.113  As the World Bank notes, “remittances are widely 
dispersed, . . . and for the most part, remittances avoid the government 
‘middleman.’”114  Leveraging remittance flows enables governments and 
banks to benefit from the flow of many small transfers:  
For some recipient countries, remittances are large 
enough to have broader macroeconomic implications.  By 
generating a steady stream of foreign-exchange earnings, 
they can improve a country’s creditworthiness for external 
borrowing, and through innovative financing mechanisms 
(such as securitization), they can expand access to capital and 
lower borrowing costs.115   
Remittance leveraging relies on the quantity and predictability of small 
transfers to provide loan collateral.     
From the perspective of remittance senders and recipient families, 
there is nothing inherently wrong with the securitization of remittance 
flows, whether such remittance-backed borrowing is undertaken by 
recipient country banks or even governments.116  Such borrowing could, 
                                                                                                                          
Latin America’s poor are bifurcated by remittances in ways that reveal the hard choices families 
make when considering emigration.  In Enrique’s Journey, based on a feature story series for which she 
won a Pulitzer, Sonia Nazario followed the footsteps of a Honduran boy as he crossed Mexico to reach 
his mother in North Carolina.  SONIA NAZARIO, ENRIQUE’S JOURNEY: THE STORY OF A BOY’S 
DANGEROUS ODYSSEY TO REUNITE WITH HIS MOTHER (2007).  The protagonist’s mother had been 
forced to abandon her own children to seek work in the United States because in Honduras she did not 
make enough to feed or educate her children.  Id. at 3–4.  Work in the United States translated into 
remittance money for food, schooling, and even toys, but the most heart-breaking aspect of Nazario’s 
reporting are the effects that growing up without their parents had on the children left behind. Id. at 11–
12.  And it is not limited to emotional damage; Nazario suggests that the gang problem plaguing many 
Central American countries is fueled in part by the hidden costs created by the effect of the departure of 
remittance-providing family members on children left behind.  Id. at 24.  Yet, by presenting the 
dramatically different housing quality that remittances enable, Nazario also shows the hardship faced 
by those not supported by family members who emigrated to the United States.  Id. at 17. 
112 See Alvaro Lima & Peter Plastrik, Leveraging Immigrant Remittances for Development, NEW 
ENG. COMTY. DEVS. 2006, at 1, 3 (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Boston, Mass.) (explaining that 
customer loyalty and the fact that remittance flows “are not severely affected by economic downturns” 
make “banks . . . attracted to remittance flows”).   
113 For more on securitization, see Suhas Ketkar & Dilip Ratha, Development Financing During a 
Crisis: Securitization of Future Receivables 21 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 2582, 2001) (discussing the securitization potential of global remittances using 1998 
figures).   
114 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 105. 
115 Id. at 86; de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 29.   
116 For a technical explanation of how remittance cash flow securitization works, see Heather 
Hughes, Understanding Securitization of Worker Remittances, in MOBILISING CAPITAL FOR THE 
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for example, be directed towards pro-poor policies and programs.  Even 
reducing the cost of national debt through remittance backing can help the 
remittance sending and receiving communities by allowing countries to 
keep more money for social programs.  Thus, using remittance flows to 
lower debt payments arguably steers clear of the weak criticism that the 
government is using people’s assets in a non-beneficial way.  However, a 
stronger version of this critique focuses not only on how the leveraged 
borrowing is used, but also on the process by which such decisions are 
made.  The argument: since the money underlying remittance flow belongs 
to remittance senders and recipients, the benefits that derive from the scale 
and predictability of remittances flows belong in some way to the 
community of senders and receivers.  Yet, as Professor Heather Hughes 
observes, regarding remittance securitization: 
A tension exists between, on the one hand, any effort to pro-
actively structure transactions to achieve certain collective, 
substantive ends and, on the other hand, respecting the results 
of market transactions entered into by developing region 
banks as necessarily representative of local interests as they 
define them.  But at the same time it is not necessarily clear 
whose interests any given originating bank represents.117  
Remittance transmitting banks, and the governments that use such 
banks, have a colorable argument that because they are facilitating such 
transfers they have a claim on the benefits from these flows.  As will be 
discussed in Part III.A, remittance senders have seen the cost of sending 
remittances fall remarkably over the past decade, and, to the extent that 
banks are using gains from remittance-backed borrowing to pay for the 
reduction in cost to remittance consumers, banks have a corresponding 
claim on how remittance flows are leveraged.   
3.  Work Incentives 
For receiving families, by making work less necessary and distorting 
the perceived return from work, remittance income can and does diminish 
the attractiveness of work.  As the Economist observed, “[t]here may also 
be economic costs associated with reliance on remittances.  Like any 
unearned wealth, they may foster idleness among those who benefit.”118  
For Latin American countries, where the effect of work incentive data is 
available, “remittances have the effect of reducing the number of hours 
worked per week.”119  Income and substitution effects drive remittance-
                                                                                                                          
POOR—WHAT CAN STRUCTURED FINANCE CONTRIBUTE? (Ingrid Matthäus-Maier & J.D. von Pischke, 
eds., forthcoming 2008).  
117 Id. at 8.   
118 The Importance of Remittances, supra note 7.   
119 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 31.    
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based work reductions: 
Remittances may tend to reduce the supply of labor 
provided by remaining household members, who may take a 
portion of the remittance gain as leisure.  This income effect 
is generally not a concern, because it represents part of the 
welfare gain from remittances.  By contrast, remittances may 
change the return to supplying labor, for example, if the 
migrant conditions the remittance on low household income.  
Such a substitution effect will reduce the welfare gain from 
remittances by distorting household labor decisions.120 
While the income effect is a welfare gain to remittance-receiving 
families, the income effect is a concern from a national and community 
development concern.  Remittance recipient “supplemental” leisure lowers 
national production (subject to offset by increased spending made possible 
by the remittances) and, by reducing the demand for employment, can lead 
to elevated wages—relative to the wage-rate absent remittances—that 
narrow the range of business types that can earn a profit.   
Suppose a remittance recipient family is fortunate and receives $500 
monthly from their hermano lejano.  Family members quite rationally 
might decide it is not worth working for a mere $185 per month—their 
standard of living without accounting for leisure would be better if they 
worked, but once leisure is taken into account, for some it can make sense 
to rely solely on the remittances.121  The disincentive to work can be 
exacerbated where the remittance sender is motivated to make sure basic 
needs are met for family members back home.  In turn, this would reduce 
remittance sending were remittance-recipients able to meet some of their 
needs through their own labor.  Seen negatively, the substitution effect is a 
case of recipient family members free-riding off the work of the remittance 
sender.  But such “free-riding” arguably reflects shared family values.  If a 
remittance sender is in a country where $185 can be earned through a few 
days work and receivers would have to work all month for the same 
amount of money, though the hermano lejano ultimately becomes the 
burdened family member, this household labor distortion might be the 
optimal ex ante, pre-emigration, allocation of labor.  Even though the 
hermano lejano conditions remittance sending on family need and would 
lower the amount sent if need fell, the remittance sender may support the 
decision of family members not to work in the home country’s lower 
                                                                                                                          
120 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 123–24 (footnote omitted).   
121 In some misleading respects this is similar to the problematic aspects of welfare Charles 
Murray dramatized through his depiction of the choice to work and marry for his hypothetical couple, 
Harold and Phyllis.  CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154–62 (1984).  Such an analogy, however, 
is misleading because remittance income is being “earned” by a member of the family, albeit one 
working in another country.     
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paying labor market.   
Yet worthy of note, the intangible consequences of remittance-driven 
work disincentives are hard to capture quantitatively.  Work disincentives 
do not simply lower the amount produced by recipient countries; reduced 
need to work can alter the social fabric in countries where a large 
percentage of people receive remittances.  “[A] number of development 
practitioners have noted the negative social implications associated with 
the fact of important segments of the younger generation becoming used to 
receiving steady flows of remittances without any effort on their part,” a 
trend which can impact work incentives and life choices.122  
The Salvadoran government faces a youth gang problem that not only 
is a destabilizing force in the country but also is another connection 
between El Salvador and the Salvadoran expatriate community.123  Mara 
Salvatrucha, “The Most Dangerous Gang in America” according to 
Newsweek, operates across the United States and Central America, with a 
strong connection to El Salvador.124  While MS-13, as it is also known, is 
more a byproduct of limited opportunities and ripple effects from the 
Salvadoran civil war, remittances may play a role in acculturating youth to 
not working traditional jobs to earn a living.  While gang membership 
undoubtedly reflects much more than an effect of remittances, an 
exaggerated culture of consumerism is a likely offshoot of high remittance 
receipts.     
In considering the potential work disincentives associated with 
remittances, perspective must be maintained regarding the relative scope of 
the problem and the room for leisure choices in recipient countries.  
Though remittance-recipients are subject to work disincentive concerns, 
the effect of such disincentives are rarely raised when another group, hijos 
de papi (Salvadoran slang for the children of the rich who live off the 
largess of their parents), are considered.  The exclusive examination of the 
income of the poor remittance-recipients and simultaneous lack of 
examination of the income of the wealthy should not be surprising, but 
should also not distort how the choices facing remittance-recipients are 
understood.125  The many effects remittances can have make it impossible 
to closet the impact of remittances to a given set of inevitable 
consequences.  Thus, in the same recipient-country, some families’ 
remittances will help put food on the table, while, for others, remittances 
may lead to voluntary underemployment or excessive consumerism.  It is, 
however, important not to conflate limited or theoretical remittance ills 
                                                                                                                          
122 CLOSE TO HOME, supra note 5, at 2.   
123 See Coffino, supra note 23, at 203 (noting that “criminal violence continues to wreak havoc” 
in El Salvador).   
124 Arian Campo-Flores, The Most Dangerous Gang in America, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 28, 2005.   
125 Ezra Rosser, Obligations of Privilege, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1, 2 (2007).     
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with actual rejection of work or rampant consumerism.  “In Central 
American countries, remittances may help households cope beyond 
meeting their basic food needs, but they will still need additional income in 
order to meet other necessities.”126  Manual Orozco estimates that “the cost 
of living in Latin American countries is at least two or three times the 
average amount received in remittances.”127  As one Salvadoran quoted in 
the Nation stated, “I completely disagree that remesas make bums out of 
us.”128  Even with remittances, most remittance-recipients are struggling to 
provide for the basic needs of their family and are not in a position to make 
an effort–leisure trade-off because of remittances.   
D.  Ownership of Remittances 
The danger when considering the anti-poverty or development 
potential of remittances is that researchers, and, more importantly policy 
makers, might forget that remittances are more than simply monetary 
flows; that remittance transfers belong to each migrant and recipient 
family.  So far this paper has highlighted the scale and anti-poverty aspects 
of remittances—an emphasis that follows from the existing research on 
remittances globally.  For though there is variation country-to-country,129 
generally, “[w]hile the impact of remittances on growth is unclear, 
remittances do play an important role in reducing the incidence and 
severity of poverty (with no significant effect on income inequality).”130  
And while the focus is about to shift to structural impacts of remittances 
and development potential, it is important to approach such considerations 
from the right perspective.  In thinking about remittances, it is the effect of 
“personal flows from migrants to their friends and family” being discussed, 
and, as such, remittances “should not be taxed or directed to specific 
development uses.”131  As a World Bank remittance overview states:  
In policy circles it is often debated whether there may be 
ways to encourage the use of remittances for more productive 
purposes than for consumption or for purchasing land and 
houses.  While such a question may be appropriate for 
official aid flows, it is not entirely appropriate for personal 
remittance flows.132 
                                                                                                                          
126 OROZCO, supra note 41, at 2.   
127 Id.     
128 Peter Davis, Letter from El Salvador: At the Edges of Empire, NATION, July 11, 2005, at 18.   
129 For example, in El Salvador, remittances do reduce inequality.  See supra note 73 and 
accompanying text.   
130 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xiii.   
131 Ratha, supra note 19, at 1.  It is worth noting that the argument that remittances themselves 
should not be taxed or directed to specific uses does not necessarily undercut the argument that the 
financing attendant to the remittance flows should be directed to specific development uses.       
132 Maimbo & Ratha, supra note 5, at 7.   
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And from the Inter-American Dialogue Task Force on Remittances:  
In addressing these issues, the task force started with a 
central premise—that the sending of remittances is 
unambiguously a private matter and that the basis of any 
constructive public policy or program is acknowledgment of 
the private nature of these flows.  Every member of the task 
force agreed that remittances should not be taxed.  They also 
agreed that remittances should not be directed to government 
programs . . . .133    
Given the amount of money being sent North to South, from one 
developing country to another, as well as the increasing recognition of the 
scale of these remittance transfers, the temptation to attempt directing these 
flows to better uses is ever-present.134  But with the determination of 
“better use” by definition not following the sender’s priorities (except 
perhaps in the case of money sent by hometown associations), the 
paternalism that underlies this temptation ought to be troubling.  
Attempting, to direct remittance use, now that the power of remittances is 
receiving attention, may have the perverse effect of diminishing 
remittances or at least driving remittance sending underground.  More 
fundamentally, directing remittance use is like mandating that purchasers 
must buy apples instead of oranges.  For, just as the decision between 
apples or oranges is rightly understood as being within the province of the 
purchaser, how migrants and their family members use their remittance 
money is equivalently their call.   
III.  REMITTANCE COSTS, REGULATION, AND TAXATION 
Remittance awareness has led to a number of remittance policy 
challenges which owe themselves to rent-seeking efforts by money transfer 
organizations and politicians.  The primary challenges facing remittance 
growth and effectiveness are lowering transfer costs and dealing with 
regulatory threats.  Through transfer costs and burdensome regulation, 
businesses and governments seek to take a bite out of the money being sent 
by immigrants to loved ones.   
“Rent-seeking” describes efforts by individuals or institutions to 
capture the value created by an activity in a way that does not add value. 
This can be contrasted with “profit-seeking” activities which also seek to 
capture returns or rewards, but do more than simply skim off value.  
                                                                                                                          
133 INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 4. 
134 WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at xiii (“Despite the prominence given to remittances from 
developed countries, South-South remittance flows make up between 30 and 45 percent of total 
remittances received by developing countries, reflecting the fact that over half of migrants from 
developing countries migrate to other developing countries.”).   
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Financial intermediaries in the transfer of money from senders to recipients 
seek to capture supra-normal profits through information asymmetries and 
other market failures.  Similarly, politicians seek to use the choice of 
immigrants to send money to loved ones as an opportunity to extract a tax 
from the immigrant population.  In this Part, transfer costs and regulatory 
effects are explored in turn.      
Financial intermediaries stand in the middle of the remittance 
relationship, charging a wide range of fees to deliver money (or remitted 
goods).  The range in fees suggests more is at play than simply market 
differentiation.  Market failure, or at least market opportunism, seems to 
play a significant—though declining—role in preventing a decline in 
remittance costs.  If there is not a competitive remittance market, the 
question becomes whether a laissez-faire approach emphasizing the power 
of the invisible hand, market intervention, or legal regulation protective of 
hermanos lejanos is the appropriate response to the anti-competitive forces 
affecting the remittance market.   
A.  Remittance Transfer Costs 
According to Adam Smith, the community benefits from the individual 
self-interested actions of each individual, leading to socially optimal 
outcomes solely through the workings of the market.  Faith in the power of 
the market is more justified when the market reflects competitive pricing: 
An industry in which there are so many firms that no one 
of them can influence the market price by its individual 
decisions and in which there are so many consumers that the 
individual utility-maximizing decisions of no one consumer 
can affect the market price is called a perfectly competitive 
industry.135 
Were the remittance-sending market perfectly competitive, ignoring 
for the moment forms of product differentiation such as time to delivery, 
the observed differences in cost of sending remittances should collapse to a 
single price point that could be expected to be at or below the current 
lowest remittance-sending fees.136  This is clearly not the case.  However, 
                                                                                                                          
135 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 33 (4th ed. 2004).   
136 Assistant Treasury Secretary Wayne A. Abernathy argued in testimony before Congress that 
discussion that focuses on cost alone can be incomplete: 
[R]emittance providers compete for business in many ways.  Cost is one 
factor.  Other factors are speed, reliability, security, and convenience.  Some 
distribution services have a higher price than others.  But they differ in other ways.  
They may be offering more services.  For example, some non-bank services charge 
more than banks, but they may be more convenient to use, especially for the 
recipients.  In some countries, banks simply do not have branches in rural 
communities.  Using a bank might cost the sender less, but it might require the 
recipient to walk several miles to the nearest bank, rather than to the nearest 
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on both the “firm” and “consumer” sides of the supply-demand curves 
there are some promising reasons to believe that the remittance-sending 
industry has become, and will continue to become, more competitive.137 
The size of the U.S. outbound remittance market has dramatically 
expanded.  By 2002, sending from the United States through remittances 
was thirty-five times as large as it was in 1970, based purely on official 
balance of payments statistics.138  According to a U.S. Federal Reserve 
study, “[t]he remittance market is increasing rapidly in volume and 
international importance,” and in 2004 included over $30 billion sent from 
the United States to Latin America.139  Even with a more narrow focus on 
the remittance market to El Salvador, the increasing volume of the market 
is impressive.140   
Just as demand has soared, additional organizations and companies 
have stepped into the remittance market, constraining through their 
presence the power of the earlier intermediary firms to dictate the market 
price for sending remittances.  In 2000, Manuel Orozco wrote an 
informative article that marched through the various mechanisms for 
sending remittances and the charges for sending $100, $200, or $300 using 
each mechanism.141  Orozco presented the advantages/disadvantages and 
                                                                                                                          
distribution agent of the non-bank.  Which costs more?  Hard to say just by looking 
at the price of the transmission in isolation. 
Remittances: Reducing Costs, Increasing Competition, and Broadening Access to the Market: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Wayne A. Abernathy, 
Assistant Treasury Secretary); see also Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency—A 
Progress Report Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, 
and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong., 10, 65 (2007) (statement of Mark 
Thompson, Western Union Company) (arguing that “[p]rice is not the sole factor considered by 
consumers” and that “too often remittances are viewed by policymakers as a commodity”). 
137 Price competition could inspire service competition, and vice versa, ideally with the winning 
mix of firms offering a range of price points that allow remittance senders the ability to select their 
preferred mix of service and expense. 
138 Dilip Ratha, Workers’ Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development 
Finance, in REMITTANCES: DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FUTURE PROSPECTS, supra note 5, at 19, 26 
fig.1.7; see also Acosta et al., supra note 20, at 958 (finding that “remittance flows to Latin America 
have increased twenty-fold since 1980”). 
139 Hilgert et al., supra note 24, at 2. 
140 On the supply side, the fees for remittances reflect both the broader and more narrow markets 
as some remittance intermediaries operate solely with the Salvadoran community and others deliver to 
many other countries as well. 
141 Manuel Orozco, Remittances and Markets: New Players and Practices (Inter-Am. Dialogue 
and The Tomás Rivera Policy Inst., Working Paper, 2000), available at http://www. 
microfinancegateway.com/files/21609_remit_and_market.htm [hereinafter Remittances and Markets].  
In 2002, Orozco came out with another report, studying nearly eighty remittance companies, again 
finding sending costs were too high.  MANUEL OROZCO, MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT FUND, THE 
INTER-AMERICAN DEV. BANK, ATTRACTING REMITTANCES: MARKET, MONEY AND REDUCED COSTS 
(2002) [hereinafter ATTRACTING REMITTANCES], available at http://www.rree.gob.sv/sitio/img.nsf/ 
vista/documentos/$file/market%20money%20and%20costs.pdf.  For more on IRNet and the efforts 
credit unions have made to enter the remittance market, see ANNA CORA EVANS & JANETTE KLAEHN, 
WORLD COUNCIL OF CREDIT UNIONS, INC., A TECHNICAL GUIDE TO REMITTANCES: THE CREDIT 
UNION EXPERIENCE (Brian Branch ed., 2004), available at http://www.woccu.org/functions/view_ 
document.php?id=remittances_techguide. 
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costs charged by Western Union, MoneyGram, the U.S. Postal Service’s 
Dinero Seguro program, Gigante Express, a selection of courier agencies, 
and IRNet, a credit union alternative to sending remittances that channels 
money through Citibank.142  Since 2000, in addition to the money transfer 
operations (MTO) which Orozco surveyed, “a new crop of options has 
sprung up, offering more choices and often lower prices.”143  These new 
options must compete with both formal and informal ways of remitting 
money.144  In addition to the effect this has on hermanos lejanos, as Sarah 
Gammage, an Economic Policy Institute research associate, recently 
observed, “[t]he proliferation of remittance transfer agencies is also 
changing the financial landscape in El Salvador.”145 
The combined effect of these demand and supply changes has made 
“sending money across borders . . . much cheaper and more accessible than 
it used to be.”146  “[I]ncrease in competition in the remittance market has 
resulted in a decrease in the cost of sending remittances from the United 
States.”147  The U.S. Government Accountability Office continued in a 
November 2005 report on remittances, “the average cost of sending $250 
[to LAC countries] has fallen from 12.5 percent in 2003 to 7 percent in 
2005.”148  Despite the report’s next sentence caveat that “price reductions 
have leveled off recently,”149 this rapid change, arguably reflecting the 
power of the invisible hand, deserves to be celebrated!  As Donald Terry, 
Manager of the Multilateral Investment Fund, stated in a San Francisco 
                                                                                                                          
142 ATTRACTING REMITTANCES, supra note 141, at 3–9; Remittances and Markets, supra note 
141.   
143 Carolyn Said, Remittance Market Draws Major Players: Banks, Cards, Credit Unions Enter 
the Fray, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2006, at F3.  The U.S. Government Accountability Office, in 
November 2005, released a report that both updates Orozco and describes new remittances mechanisms 
by type.  U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL REMITTANCES: INFORMATION ON 
PRODUCTS, COSTS, AND CONSUMER DISCLOSURES (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d06204.pdf. 
144 For a history and comparison of different global informal money transfer systems, see U.N. 
Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Discussion Paper: Informal Money Transfer Systems: Opportunities and 
Challenges for Development Finance, 13, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/2002/DP/26 (Nov. 2002) (prepared by 
Leonides Buencamino & Sergei Gorbunov) [hereinafter Informal Money Transfer Systems]; see also 
Sarah Gammage, Viajeros y Viajeras en El Salvador: Connecting Worlds, Cementing Ties (2003), 
available at http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~migrate1/ResearchPapers/GammageWorkingPaperNo.2.pdf 
(discussing the informal couriers serving the Salvadoran community). 
145 Gammage, supra note 34, at 8. 
146 Patrick K. Barron, First Vice President and Chief Operation Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Atlanta, Speech at the Sumaq Summit, International Business Strategies in Latin America: Lowering 
Barriers to Cross-Border Payments (May 5, 2004), available at http://www.frbatlanta.org/invoke. 
cfm?objectid=5573C526-DDA4-D25C-A89690CFD9D07A37&method=display. 
147 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 143, at 22.  Given the scale of remittance 
sending, the amount saved through cost declines is also substantial.  For Latin America these cost 
reductions meant that the “amount saved in transfer fees in 2005 alone was approximately $5 billion—
far exceeding total foreign aid to the region that year.”  INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 
5. 
148 U.S. GOV’T. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 143, at 23. 
149 Id. 
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Chronicle article, remittance “[c]osts used to be outrageous; now they’re 
simply too high.”150   
Market forces may lower remittance costs still further.  As reported in 
the Economist, “not so long ago banks steered clear of remittances . . . .  
Today big banks, hungry for new growth areas, are clamouring to offer 
wire-transfer services to immigrants.”151  Eager to attract new clients, 
banks have even offered zero-cost remittance sending,152 a move which if 
replicated across all the markets would undermine the claim—such as that 
made in an English white paper on the topic—that, “the market for 
remittance services is not working efficiently.”153  Tellingly, the English 
white paper on remittances, after noting the remittance market inefficiency, 
nevertheless concluded that “[c]ompetition amongst service providers is 
the best way of reducing transactions costs.”154   
B.  Remittance Regulation 
Before concluding that the market alone will adequately lower 
remittance costs, it is worth exploring the government’s role in 
determining remittance costs.  At the 2004 Summit of the Americas of the 
Organization of American States, “the presidents of the hemisphere 
declared the need to reduce remittance transaction costs by 50 percent in 
the next five years.”155  Such a declaration begs the question, what is the 
proper role for government in tackling remittance costs?  Even if it is 
accepted that there is “lack of competition” in the remittance market and 
that high costs “act as a type of regressive tax on international migrants,”156 
it does not necessarily follow that government should actively seek to 
lower remittance costs.  The role of the state is complicated where 
remittances are concerned because remittances, by definition, involve two 
governments, and therefore, if the state is going to play a role in reducing 
costs, “[c]ooperation between financial authorities in sending and recipient 
                                                                                                                          
150 Carolyn Said, Costs of Remittances Strains Latinos: Sending Cash to Relatives Back Home is a 
Process Filled with Fees and Hassles, S.F. CHRON., July 16, 2006, at F1; accord de Luna Martínez, 
supra note 1, at 30 (“[F]ees paid by senders and recipients of remittances are still high.”). 
151 Into the Fold: Americans Without Bank Accounts, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2006. 
152 Id. (“Some banks try to woo the unbanked by offering free remittances.”).  Banks that reach 
out to remittance-sending communities are likely to find a client base with unmet needs for a wide 
range of financial products, from home loans to insurance, that “financial institutions can take 
advantage of.”  OROZCO, supra note 41, at 18; see also Lima & Plastrik, supra note 112, at 1 (noting 
that some observers argue that the remittance market could be “one way to draw immigrants into the 
financial system”).  For more on lowering barriers that the poor face in accessing financial services, see 
Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON REG. 121 (2004). 
153 HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 58. 
154 Id. at 59. 
155 MANUEL OROZCO, ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, REMITTANCES TO LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN: ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES ON DEVELOPMENT 1 (2004), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/news/CONFEREN/payments04/orozco.pdf. 
156 Adams, Jr. & Page, supra note 39, at 1660. 
 2008] IMMIGRANT REMITTANCES 33 
countries is required.”157  According to José de Luna Martínez:  
Given the multiple components of remittances fees, it is 
clear that efforts in developing (recipient) countries alone 
will not be sufficient to address the high remittance costs that 
senders and beneficiaries still pay.  Efforts are needed in both 
sending and receiving countries in order to bring down 
remittance fees.  A common approach and coordination 
between authorities of sending and recipient countries is 
needed to overcome factors that may hinder fees reduction, 
such as low competition among service providers, poor 
information disclosure for senders and recipients, poor 
payment system infrastructure that discourage [sic] migrants 
from using formal financial institutions to send money home, 
restrictions for cross-border operations, lack of trust of 
senders and recipients with financial institutions, etc.158 
What is clear from de Luna Martínez’s call for coordination is that 
remittance costs are impacted by a large number of policy choices and 
implicitly that an isolated regulatory change will not be sufficient by itself.  
Simple changes—such as allowing recipients to accept remittances in U.S. 
dollars and hold them until they can find the best exchange rate rather than 
being dependent on the remittance transfer operator159—are a start.  So too 
is encouraging those who have a stake in remittance costs to become 
involved in helping ensure market strength is brought to bear on high-cost 
remittance firms by educating remittance consumers of their options when 
choosing how to send money to loved ones.160   
                                                                                                                          
157 de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 31. 
158 Id. at 18. 
159 According to Yoko Niimi & Çağlar Özden, “money transfer fees and the presence of dual 
exchange rates reduce remittances.”  Niimi & Özden, supra note 97, at 3 (reporting the results of a 
study by Freund and Spatafora (2005)).  By allowing recipients to hold U.S. currency, a market for 
remittance currency exchange can be created; without such allowance, recipients are subject to 
remittance operators setting exchange rates.  See de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 19 (noting that 
allowing U.S. currency to be held has been advocated by those looking for ways to lower remittance 
costs but also noting that “in practice most developing countries already allow their citizens to open 
accounts in U.S. dollars or any other major international currency”). 
160 A number of initiatives aimed at low-income individuals outside the remittance context have 
tried to reduce the amount the poor are paying for goods or services by providing low-income 
purchasers with additional information in an effort to increase market transparency.  Matt Fellowes, 
Making Markets an Asset for the Poor, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 433, 453 (2007).  With remittances, 
as José de Luna Martínez argues, NGO-driven education can be particularly important on the sending 
side: 
Because information is critical for competition in the marketplace, authorities, 
but also NGOs in other developing countries could consider playing an active role in 
collecting, comparing and disseminating information on a regular basis about the 
fees of different money transfer products.  This may help migrants—in particular 
those that do not speak the language of their host country—to make better informed 
choices. 
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Overshadowing such piecemeal changes is the larger challenge of 
balancing anti-money laundering, anti-terrorist finance goals with 
appropriate and realistic regulation of remittance sending.  Remittances 
naturally raise concerns of money-laundering and even terrorism.  Growing 
awareness of the scale of remittance sending, and of the multitude of 
mechanisms available to send remittances has raised concerns that besides 
immigrants sending money to family members, others are using the same 
channels to launder money or finance terrorist activities.161  In the wake of 
9/11, the United States and other governments became more interested in 
tracing international transactions and began cracking down directly or 
indirectly (through banks) on informal remittance operations.162  Such 
regulation threatens to not only raise market costs, but also to make 
tracking small international monetary flows such as remittances harder, not 
easier.163   
Post-9/11 regulation and regulatory enforcement imposes a one size 
(large) fits all model on licensed remittance operators, who are required to 
keep costly records and be well capitalized.164  One perspective is that of 
Donald Terry, Manager of the Multilateral Investment Fund at the Inter-
American Development Bank.  Terry believes that the United States 
“decided that we have to fight terror with error.”165  According to a survey 
of formal sector remittance firms, regulations are having a negative effect 
on their business:   
The four largest obstacles to doing business are related to 
the regulatory regime in the U.S., either directly or indirectly. 
The largest problem is getting access to maintaining or 
                                                                                                                          
de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 19. 
161 Such terrorism concerns need not correspond with true dangers; according to Mary De Ming 
Fan, “[j]uxtaposing undocumented immigration with terrorism produces an illusory correlation,” 
negatively effecting national policy towards immigrants.  Mary De Ming Fan, The Immigration-
Terrorism Illusory Correlation and Heuristic Mistake, 10 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 33, 33, 46 (2007).  
162 Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 1 (noting that after 9/11 informal money 
transfer systems “have come under intense scrutiny by domestic and international law enforcement 
authorities”).   
163 This dual danger of rising costs and remittances pushed to informal channels through 
heightened regulations should not be overstated; paradoxically the post-9/11 regulations have been 
coupled with simultaneous significant remittance price decreases.  Nevertheless, even non-libertarians 
should bear in mind presidential candidate Ron Paul’s written statement given at a recent House 
remittances hearing: “[t]he worst thing Congress could do is intervene in an overly forceful manner and 
undo all the good things that have been done so far.”  Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market 
Efficiency—A Progress Report: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Domestic and International 
Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 24 
(2007) (opening statement of Rep. Ron Paul, Member, Subcomm. on Domestic and International 
Monetary Policy, Trade, and Technology) (submitted as a written statement). 
164 Nikos Passas, Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas, in TERRORISM 
FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 21, 35 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007).    
165 Donald Terry, Remarks at American University Law Review’s 2007 Symposium: A World on 
the Move: Legal Perspectives on a New Era of International Migration (Feb. 15, 2007) (notes on file 
with author).  
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opening accounts with U.S. banks.  Banks are the only way 
for remittance firms to access payment and settlement 
systems and to maintain transaction accounts and as such a 
crucial component in a remittance system.166   
Such an industry position may not be surprising, but in this case may 
not be that far from the mark.  In a chapter entitled, “Terrorism Financing 
Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” Nikos Passas argues American 
“regulation is missing its target” because by imposing excessive regulatory 
burdens, small corner stores and other informal remitters are forced 
underground through this “de facto ‘criminalization’ of informal 
remitters.”167  Remittance businesses typically collect money from 
immigrants and disperse money either directly or indirectly through an 
agent to recipients, doing so by grouping individual transfers using 
business accounts in major banks.  Directly, “[t]ighter regulations and 
compliance with new anti-money-laundering legislation have raised MTO 
costs of doing business.”168  Indirectly, money transfer organizations, also 
face “a significant increase in the regulatory scrutiny of banks that provide 
services to MTOs, [with] a growing number of banks . . . choosing not to 
do business with MTOs rather than absorb the higher management costs 
and increased risk.”169  When commercial banks lock out formal sector 
remittance business accounts “in response to tight anti-money laundering 
regulations and fear of bad publicity,”170 competition in the sector can 
decline, harming remittance businesses and remittance senders.171   
The greatest impact of heightened regulation may not be on price, but 
on efforts to prevent terrorist financing and money laundering.  The ability 
of governments to identify and track suspicious international transactions 
depends on those transactions taking place through channels the 
government is monitoring.172  By raising the cost and hassle of sending 
money through banks or licensed money transfer organizations, regulations 
which are overly burdensome, drive remittance senders to use informal 
                                                                                                                          
166 OLE E. ANDREASSEN, REMITTANCE SERVICE PROVIDERS IN THE UNITED STATES: HOW 
REMITTANCE FIRMS OPERATE AND HOW THEY PERCEIVE THEIR BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 9 (World 
Bank Financial Sector Discussion Series, 2006) (survey excludes Western Union and Moneygram).   
167 Passas, supra note 164, at 35.     
168 INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 8. 
169 Id.; see also Remittances: Access, Transparency, and Market Efficiency—A Progress Report: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Domestic and International Monetary Policy, Trade, and 
Technology of the H. Comm. on Financial Services, 110th Cong. 6 (2002) (testimony of Tom Haider, 
Vice President and Chief Compliance Officer Moneygram International) (citing the challenge of 
securing and retaining a bank account as a “pressing issue” for remittance firms).   
170 de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 24 n.19. 
171 ANDREASSEN, supra note 166, at 15 (describing the “large efficiency loss due to the regulatory 
regime” that can come from excessive regulation).    
172 See Passas, supra note 164, at 35 (noting that regulations imposing “unmanageable burdens” 
result in “evasion and non-compliance”).  
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mechanisms which do not report their activities to regulatory agencies.173  
As Nikos Passas describes, “unmanageable burdens for private entities or 
the government agencies that regulate them” lead predictably to “evasion 
and non-compliance.”174  Passas captures the idea that not only can 
regulatory burdens be unmanageable for businesses, but also for the 
agencies with oversight authority.175  There are alternatives: for example, 
Passas suggests that “intelligence-led and risk-based” regulation and 
enforcement, of the sort practiced by Great Britain, could improve 
targeting “without driving everyone underground.”176  Intelligence-led 
enforcement is particularly important given the impossibility of 
“[a]pplying know-your-customer rules to millions of tiny [remittance] 
transactions.”177  While a laissez-faire approach to the remittance market is 
not appropriate, neither is an approach which undoes the market’s success 
in lowering remittance costs.178   
Those who support remittance-promoting policies—motivated by 
poverty reduction or development potential, or simply fighting for the 
rights of migrants to care for their loved ones—need to frame their 
critiques of the current regulatory environment as a matter of degree and 
implementation rather than a rejection of all oversight.  Given the ease 
with which money-launderers and terrorists (there are important 
differences, but regulation is generally targeting both groups 
simultaneously) can manipulate the “formal and informal global financial 
system,”179 policymakers “arguably should refrain from over-committing 
efforts to areas with diminishing returns.”180  According to a survey of 
remittance organizations, there is “a strong dissatisfaction with what is 
perceived as close oversight of formal remittance firms but no oversight or 
                                                                                                                          
173 See Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 8 (“Overly harsh government 
interference in the remittance process could lead migrants to send a higher share of remittances through 
informal channels, the opposite of the original initial intent.”); Andreassen, supra note 166, at 10 (“[I]f 
being formal entails major obstacles to doing business, then informal competitors gain even more of an 
advantage.”); HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 55 (“Migrants’ reasons for preferring informal 
channels include considerations of cost, speed, ease of making and receiving the transfer, coverage 
within the home country, and greater confidence and trust in the service provided.”).       
174 Passas, supra note 164, at 35. 
175 See INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 8 (noting that enforcement of legitimate 
businesses wastes resources of regulators, raises business costs, and causes costs to rise for low-wage 
immigrants sending remittances).     
176 Passas, supra note 164, at 35.   
177 The Importance of Remittances, supra note 7.   
178 See Passas, supra note 164, at 21 (“Financial controls are an essential and indispensable 
counter-terrorism tool . . . .”).   
179 Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas, The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing, in 
TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 7, 11 (Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 
2007).    
180 Raphael Perl, Anti-Terror Strategy, The 9/11 Commission Report, and Terrorism Financing: 
Implications for U.S. Policy Makers, in TERRORISM FINANCING AND STATE RESPONSES 247, 258 
(Jeanne K. Giraldo & Harold A. Trinkunas eds., 2007) (noting the “increasing financial and 
technological sophistication of our adversaries and the multiplicity of fund transfer methods”).   
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attempts to regulate informal firms, which is perceived to prevent a level 
playing field and create a competitive disadvantage to the firms that are 
appropriately licensed.”181  Industry dissatisfaction must be taken with a 
grain of salt considering its self-serving nature.  Nevertheless, overly 
burdensome regulations can move the remittance market underground,182 
imposing a range of costs on those families connected in part by 
remittances.183   
C.  Taxation of Remittances 
The greatest potential regulatory threat to remittances is remittance 
taxation.  Just as overly burdensome regulation of licensed remittance 
firms can drive remitters to seek informal channels, taxation of 
remittances, by either sending or receiving countries, would have the same 
effect.  Taxing remittances is attractive to politicians in sending countries  
because such taxation targets “others” and not constituents.184  Proponents 
of remittance taxation gloss over the many ways immigrants contribute to 
the country where they work.185  They fail to see that such taxation does 
not merely ensure immigrants pay their fair share for services and benefits 
received from their, albeit somewhat reluctant, host country.186   
1.  Fiscal Impact of Immigrants 
My focus is remittances and not taxation, but given the amount of 
disinformation (and arguably xenophobia) regarding use of government 
services by immigrants relative to their payment of taxes, unfortunately it 
                                                                                                                          
181 ANDREASSEN, supra note 166, at 10 (survey excludes Western Union and Moneygram).   
182 Informal Money Transfer Systems, supra note 144, at 5 (arguing that regulatory deficiencies 
such as “extensive government intervention” and “repressive financial policies” are the “primary 
reasons for leakages from formal to informal channels”).    
183 HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 60 (arguing, in the context of informal mechanisms, 
that governments ought to “ensure that regulatory solutions are proportionate to the risks and sensitive 
to the possible impacts on those who rely on remittances”).     
184 Because the “others” in this case are often—but not always—non-citizen immigrants, taxes not 
only can target “others” but also disfavored immigrants.  Mary De Ming Fan, writing generally about 
immigrant-targeted regulation, explains, “[i]n legislative dialogue, there is a danger that heuristics of 
mistrust and fear will be deployed against those who are unrepresented or underrepresented because 
there is not the typical voter check to induce more careful constructs.”  De Ming Fan, supra note 161, 
at 46.   
185 See, e.g., Issues Regarding the Sending of Remittances: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,  107th Cong. 3 (2002) (statement of Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez) 
(“These people came here seeking a better way of life and, indeed, they are making life better for all of 
us.”).     
186 See, e.g., Brenda Walker, Should Immigrants Be Taxed?, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 2, 2002, at A19 
(proposing a remittance tax to fund U.S. hospitals near the U.S.-Mexico border, arguing “[t]axing 
remittances 10 percent to 15 percent per transaction would be fair because the cost would fall on those 
who benefit”); see also Sue Kirchhoff, Immigration Debate Squeezes Some Businesses; Cities, States 
Passing Rash of Laws on Illegal Aliens, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2007, at 1B (reporting on a remittance 
tax proposal introduced before the Texas legislature under the theory that not raising such tax money 
would not be “fair to everyone”).    
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is worth briefly highlighting that immigrants do pay more than their fair 
share.  Professor Francine J. Lipman introduces her recent study on the 
topic: 
Many Americans believe that undocumented immigrants 
are exploiting the United States economy.  The widespread 
belief is that “illegal aliens” cost more in government 
services than they contribute to the economy.  This belief is 
demonstrably false.  “[E]very empirical study of illegals’ 
economic impact demonstrates the opposite . . . : 
undocumenteds actually contribute more to public coffers in 
taxes than they cost in social services.”187  
Later in the same article, after contrasting the many taxes 
undocumented immigrants pay188 with legal limitations on the ability of 
undocumented immigrants to take advantage of government programs 
(which  the rest of us take for granted),189 Lipman observes, 
“undocumented immigrants provide a fiscal windfall” to American 
citizens.190  Lipman’s conclusions echo those of nearly every other study 
that similarly concluded that the benefits to native-born Americans of 
                                                                                                                          
187 Lipman, supra note 29, at 1–2 (footnotes omitted) (quoting an earlier study by Peter L. Reich, 
Public Benefits for Undocumented Aliens: State Laws Into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REV. 
219, 244–46 (1991)).    
188 Lipman, supra note 29, at 5 (footnotes omitted) (“[E]ach year undocumented immigrants add 
billions of dollars in sales, excise, property, income, and payroll taxes, including Social Security, 
Medicare and unemployment taxes, to federal, state and local coffers.  Hundreds of thousands of 
undocumented immigrants go out of their way to file annual federal and state income tax returns.”); see 
also Nina Bernstein, Tax Returns Rise for Immigrants in U.S. Illegally, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at 1 
(explaining how undocumented immigrants without social security numbers can file taxes using IRS 
assigned individual taxpayer numbers).   
189 Lipman, supra note 29, at 5.  
[U]ndocumented immigrants are barred from almost all government benefits, 
including food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Medicaid, federal 
housing programs, Supplemental Security Income, Unemployment Insurance, Social 
Security, Medicare, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Generally, the only 
benefits federally required for undocumented immigrants are emergency medical 
care, subject to financial and category eligibility, and elementary and secondary 
public education.  
Id. at 5–6. 
190 Id. at 7.  A study by the National Research Council is illustrative of the challenges involved in 
accounting for the fiscal costs of immigrants: the study found an annual immigration fiscal impact of 
$232 per native household. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, 
DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION 292 (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 
1997).  The study then noted the limitations of such annual snapshots, arguing that the study’s figures 
should be adjusted because for “changing demographics” such as the fact that today’s children who 
consume services will become taxpayers in the future.  Id. at 294.  The study ultimately concluded that 
in the long-run current immigrants had an “overall positive” fiscal impact on the United States.  Id. at 
353.  For a review of a number of fiscal impact studies, see GEORGES VERNEZ & KEVIN F. MCCARTHY, 
THE COSTS OF IMMIGRATION TO TAXPAYERS 5–18 (1996).  See also Eduardo Porter, Illegal 
Immigrants Are Bolstering Social Security With Billions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2005 at A1 (noting that 
undocumented workers are “providing the [Social Security] system with a subsidy of as much as $7 
billion a year”).   
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immigration exceed the costs.191  Therefore, though many Americans 
believe that immigrants “use more social services than they pay for 
through taxes,”192 given that this is a misconception, the argument that 
sending-country remittance taxation is justified as a way to capture 
otherwise unpaid tax obligations is not convincing.193  
 2.  Remittance Taxation 
A remittance tax imposed by sending countries would not be an 
income tax, but would instead be analogous to cigarette or other “sin 
taxes.”  Such tax proposals seek to discourage or punish bad behavior, in 
this case the choice to send remittances rather than spend money locally.  
Yet, as a consumption tax, remittance taxation would be crude and 
regressive, diminishing the ability of migrants to help provide support for 
family members left behind.  Given the qualitative difference between 
typical products subject to “vice” taxes and remittances, anti-immigrant 
sentiment probably explains taxing proposals more than supposed fairness 
grounds for remittance consumption taxes.   
The incentives for receiving countries to tax remittances are arguably 
less problematic, though how such taxation is felt is similar.  For recipient 
countries with weak economies, it can be a challenge for governments to 
identify sources of collectable tax revenue.  Remittances that pass through 
formal channels not only can be traced but, if taxed, can be collected 
immediately upon the money entering the country.  If the tax is seen as a 
tax on recipients, then the government is taxing those who, depending on 
the country, do have the power to voice their opposition politically.  But 
arguably, the incidence of a tax on remittance-receiving countries, like  
taxes imposed on remittance sendering countries, would impose a tax on 
those who may not have a meaningful vote in either their home country or 
their new country.194  It is money earned by remittance senders that would 
                                                                                                                          
191 COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISORS, IMMIGRATION’S ECONOMIC IMPACT 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/cea_immigration_062007.pdf (concluding “that immigration has a 
positive effect on the American economy as a whole and on the income of native-born American 
workers,” adding as a key finding that “[c]areful studies of the long-run fiscal effects of immigration 
conclude that it is likely to have a modest, positive influence”).   
192 Eric S. Rothman & Thomas J. Espenshade, Fiscal Impacts of Immigration to the United States, 
53 POPULATION INDEX 381, 381 (1992).  It must be acknowledged that some studies suggest that 
American intuition plays a role at a local level.  Id. at 410 (“The results at the state level are more 
mixed: some show immigrants are fiscal burdens; others indicate they are net benefits.  Only at the 
national level is there a paucity of evidence indicating that immigrants impose net costs on other 
residents.”).   
193 A focus on immigrant tax-take versus the fiscal expenditure risks obscures the many other 
benefits immigrants provide the United States.  See Doris Meissner et al., Immigration and America’s 
Futures: A New Chapter, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 473, 474–77 (2007) (citing the role of immigrants 
filling labor market gaps, being entrepreneurial, helping with innovation and science).       
194 Many countries do continue to afford emigrants the right to vote, but practical constraints such 
as the cost of returning home (and the related cost of returning to the United States, especially if the 
emigrant is an undocumented worker) limit voting by hermanos lejanos.  For more on dual nationality, 
 
 40 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
be taken by the tax, and to some extent remittances have fewer labor costs 
to remittance-recipients.  Thus, if senders and recipients are viewed as a 
single family unit and the unit pays the tax, senders likely would “feel” and 
“pay” such taxes more than their family members whose experience with 
the tax would be more analogous to their limited experience with fees 
imposed by remittance firms.     
Remittance taxation would lead to a deliberate movement away from 
formal channels towards informal remittance channels, regardless of 
whether the tax is imposed by remittance-sending countries or remittance-
receiving countries.  Since taxation relies upon government knowledge of 
remittance transactions, transactions that occur through unlicensed, 
informal remitters would not be subject to remittance taxes, or rather, to 
remittance tax collection.195  As is the case with burdensome regulation 
generally, taxation driven “informalization” of the remittance transmitting 
market would threaten to undo the progress that has been made in lowering 
costs.  
More fundamentally, proposals to tax remittances mischaracterize the 
phenomenon, transforming remittances from what they are—“personal 
flows of money from migrants to their friends and families”—to something 
they should not bea flow of money to be taxed or used only for specific 
purposes by governments.196  When considering possible regulation of 
remittances, whether accomplished by overly constrictive market rules or 
by direct taxation, the starting point for “any constructive public policy or 
program is acknowledgment of the private nature of these flows.”197  
Unless there is acknowledgement of the private aspect of remittances, the 
recently “discovered” scale and importance of remittance activity invites 
rent-seeking by politicians, eager to score anti-immigrant points in sending 
countries or to tax an observable revenue stream in receiving countries.   
D.  Concluding Regulatory Thoughts  
Many goods and services are associated with known prices, or at least 
with a relatively stable, andcriticallyknown range of acceptable prices.  
                                                                                                                          
see Michael Jones-Correa, Under Two Flags: Dual Nationality in Latin America and Its Consequences 
for Naturalization in the United States, 35 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 997, 997 (2001).  Despite practical 
difficulties in voting, dual citizenship rights do serve to strengthen the tie between hermanos lejanos 
and their home country.  In close elections, those who can afford to and who have strong feelings about 
the election outcome will return home to vote, and those who cannot afford to return often follow the 
election results.  See, e.g., Claudia Nuñez, Elecciones al Aire, EL DIARIO DE HOY, Mar. 21, 2004 
(providing information for hermanos lejanos on how to follow the 2004 Presidential elections results).  
195 While laws may require tax be paid on all remittances, regardless of mechanism, given limited 
enforcement capabilities of most receiving countries, tax evasion and non-reporting would likely dwarf 
voluntary reporting and hold down government collection (similar to the familiar problems in the 
United States of under-reporting of tips or earnings from spot labor or from the informal economy).   
196 Ratha, supra note 19, at 1.    
197 INTER-AMERICAN DIALOGUE, supra note 4, at 4. 
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Remittance transfer services have not yet reached that stage of market 
definition, though market forces are driving firms towards a narrowing 
band of acceptable charges for sending money to particular countries.  
When I go to a Taco Bell in Cambridge, I expect to be charged roughly the 
same as I would be charged by a Taco Bell in Durango, Colorado, and I 
“know” I am not getting a good deal if the price of a bean burrito is above 
one dollar.198  The same can be said for my purchases of socks, notebooks, 
and even Ipods.  Remittance costs are only beginning to take on a similar 
characteristic.  Given the market’s success since 2000 in driving down 
transfer costs, it is premature to impose a solution to the still too high, 
though much lower, costs.199  Remittances reflect a division between 
earners from spenders, with the consumption taking place overseas.  But, 
the fact that consumption takes place overseas does not preclude the 
benefit from reaching remittance-sending countries.200  Hermanos lejanos 
and the rest of American society benefit, albeit in different ways, from the 
income generated to send remittances, as well as the actual sending of 
remittances.  Consequently, while it is premature to seek a governmental 
solution to lower remittance costs, now is the time to reject proposals to 
heighten regulation or taxation of remittances.  
IV.  THE APPEAL AND LIMITS OF REMITTANCES 
By demonstrating the potential of markets and by giving recognition to 
the work of the poor, remittance scholarship and attention on remittances 
escapes easy identification as being essentially the domain of 
“conservative” or “liberal” politicians or academics.  The same can be said 
                                                                                                                          
198 For the role of retailers in helping to establish perceptions regarding appropriate pricing of 
goods, see CHARLES FISHMAN, THE WAL-MART EFFECT 115−16 (2006) (arguing that Wal-Mart, by 
deeply discounting their sales relative to independent dealers, changes our understanding of the proper 
price of a lawn mower).    
199 Information gaps are likely to allow the greatest room for upward pricing by remittance 
businesses located in areas where immigrant populations are lower.  For example, a city such as New 
Orleans with a sizable Honduran population may have low cost mechanisms available, known to the 
community for sending money to Honduras.  However, smaller immigrant communities from other 
countries in the same city may know and share less about inexpensive mechanisms and consequently 
may have to pay more to send money home.  Efforts by government entities and non-profits to 
disseminate comparative cost information to immigrant communities can be valuable when the 
community is too small to accomplish this independently.   
200 Professor Raquel Aldana observes that remittance money spent in El Salvador might not be 
that different from money spent in the United States to the extent that remittance-based purchases are 
of U.S. products; in such cases, the trickle down purchase effect flows in part to the recipient country 
and in part to the sending country.  Email from Raquel Aldana to author (Dec. 20, 2007) (on file with 
Connecticut Law Review); see also GHOSH, supra note 2, at 78 (noting that when remittances entail 
“conspicuous consumption, with excessive expenditure on foreign luxury products and sophisticated 
household appliances to show off the newly found wealth, this may not only contribute to social 
division but may also lend an enhanced prestige value to foreign products, alongside a psychological 
downgrading of domestic goods”).  But see Torrisi, supra note 30, at 130 (arguing that “[r]emittances 
are recycled within the local economy in El Salvador”).   
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of micro-lending and land-titling initiatives.201  Navigating around 
ideological capture paradoxically risks coloring our view of remittances in 
a way that wrongly elevates remittances from what they representa way 
for immigrants to reduce the effects of poverty on distant family 
membersto what we want remittances to be, a path to development.  A 
first step in properly contextualizing remittances is to resist the first-world 
capture of remittance dialogue threatening to transform our understanding 
of remittances from an economic phenomenon of transnational families 
into a form of North-South development aid.202  A South-North 
orientation,203 rather than a Washington down approach, prioritizes the 
lived experiences of those communities most dependent on and affected by 
remittances, who rely on unimpeded transfers.204  Understanding how 
remittances fit into “chastened neoliberalism,” characteristic of current law 
and development thought, helps explain the rhetorical success that 
remittance advocates have had.205  However, the price of remittance 
emphasis is not minimal; focusing on remittances alone risks overlooking 
the many background rules (from immigration law to employment 
practices to gendered relations) that drive remittance practices.  Finally, 
global development requires more from both sending and receiving 
countries than merely reaping remittance benefits.   
The work remittances do lessening the effects of poverty for recipient 
families in the developing world relies upon a more fluid global labor 
market than is formally incorporated in our immigration law.  Even as we 
applaud the ability remittances have to provide resources to those who 
need them, we must not turn a blind eye to the development stagnation of 
many remittance-recipient countries.  American responsibility to help with 
the development of the third-world is not and will not be met through 
remittances.  The same can be said with regard to developing countries and 
the responsibilities that their governments bear.  Indeed, full recognition of 
the role of remittances for developing countries may require remittance 
                                                                                                                          
201 See, e.g., Sasha Polakow-Suransky, Giving the Poor Some Credit: Microloans are in Vogue. 
Are They a Sound Idea?, 14 AM. PROSPECT, May 2003, at A19, available at http://www.prospect. 
org/cs/articles?article=giving_the_poor_some_credit (noting that microcredit “is one of those ideas that 
attracts both liberals and conservatives”).   
202 Although perhaps altruistically motivated, policy analysts and politicians arguably seek 
advancement by transforming remittance knowledge into the language and culture of developed 
countries without giving proper credit to the wealth of relevant experience possessed by remittance 
receiving countries. 
203 A South-North orientation might be overly optimistic, but arguably it would be an 
improvement to “face” South and “open” up the conversation to include those from the South.  See 
Lucie White, On the Guarding of Borders, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183, 186 (1998) (arguing for 
opening up the dialogue with those outside our borders in the immigration context).   
204 By locating the remittance dialogue in countries such as El Salvador, the Philippines, and 
Haiti, a presumption in favor of open remittance channels is established, enabling recipient countries 
and transnational families to more effectively draw upon human rights and equitable principles to resist 
the tax and regulatory interests of sending countries.   
205 See infra notes 238–62 and accompanying text.   
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isolating mechanisms.  Otherwise, there is a danger that remittances will 
allow politicians in the developing world to avoid the hard choices that 
national level development requires.           
Looking forward, as the remittance phenomenon moves from being a 
favorite topic in development circles to being a focus of political and legal 
attention, the existing structure of rules and practices that have enabled the 
growth in remittances will undoubtedly change.  In a globalizing world, 
this change will take place, and, as it does, it is important not to miss the 
opportunities presented by the phenomenon.  Policies should respect and 
emulate the love transnational families demonstrate with their remittances; 
this means, at the most basic level, enabling and facilitating remittances.  
But, more ambitiously, it means seeing remittances as an aspect of the 
relationship between the developed and developing world, but not as the 
way for the developed world to satisfy its geo-political and moral 
obligations to the developing world.206  Remittances ultimately reflect the 
love that transnational families have despite the barriers and hardships they 
face, not because of American policies.  Because remittances are an anti-
poverty tool and not the route to development, we must do more to meet 
the obligations of love inherent in the recognition of our shared humanity 
with those who struggle with underdevelopment.       
A.  The Appeal 
Remittance advocates—scholars, politicians, and a number of non-
profits—do more than study remittances—they “help to define” 
remittances and remittance potential.207  Such advocates have succeeded in 
appealing “both to proponents of neoliberal economic policies and to 
analysts and advocates interested in grass-roots empowerment.”208  By 
advocating a “third way” approach between welfarism and remorseless 
capitalism,209 remittance advocates have managed to get bipartisan support 
for their work and for their policy proposals.210  Yet there is danger, rarely 
                                                                                                                          
206 In 1970, Nobel laureate Gunner Myrdal wrote, “commercial and financial policies of the 
developed countries toward the underdeveloped countries are, like all other crucial policy problems, at 
bottom a moral issue.” GUNNAR MYRDAL, THE CHALLENGE OF WORLD POVERTY 310 (1970).   
207 Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 186.   
208 Id. at 192 (emphasis omitted).  
209 Id. (internal citations omitted).    
210 As the National Council of La Raza acknowledged in a 2005 brief on remittances, Republicans 
and Democrats have both introduced pro-remittance legislation, supporting a 2004 commitment made 
by President Bush to lower remittance costs.  BEATRIZ IBARRA, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA, 
REFORMING THE REMITTANCE TRANSFER MARKET 2 (2005), available at http://www. 
nclr.org/content/publications/detail/31291.  Additionally, the Federal Reserve has gotten involved in 
remittances through both the Mexico-U.S. Automated Clearinghouse System and by giving banks 
Community Reinvestment Act credit for reaching out to remittance senders.  See Elizabeth McQuerry 
(Fed. Res. Retail Payments Office); Opportunities & Obstacles for Banks in Remittance Market 
(Powerpoint presented at Florida International University, June 4, 2005) (on file with Connecticut Law 
Review); Press Release, U.S. Rep. Joe Baca’s Office, Rep. Baca Seeks CRA Credit for Financial 
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acknowledged by advocates, that the fetishization of remittance studies 
will inspire exaggerated accounts of the scope of remittance sending and of 
the poverty alleviation and development potential of these money flows.  
Given the popularity of remittances, as shown by the profusion of 
remittance conferences, reports, and publications, a natural question to ask 
is whether this popularity is based on fundamental principles or on 
misleading characterizations and exaggerations.  
Perhaps the best way to answer this question is by considering two 
economic ideas—micro-lending and land-titling—that entered the spotlight 
before remittances.  Appreciation of micro-lending, land-titling, and now 
remittance effects crosses ideological lines.  All three draw their strength 
from capitalism and depend on regulatory changes, gaining the support of 
conservatives leery of programs that smack of global welfarism.  
Neoliberals love that micro-lending, land-titling, and remittances 
originated not from Washington, D.C. but from bankers, intellectuals, and 
families of the developing world.211  By empowering the poor, or stated 
differently, by recognizing the dynamic potential located in the poor 
themselves, these economic activities escape the usual political traps that 
derail standard anti-poverty measures such as development aid.  Now that 
the Bretton Woods institutions, the World Bank, and the International 
Monetary Fund receive external and internal skepticism from anti-poverty 
and international growth advocates, models of growth that do not rely upon 
large Washington-led institutions resonate.   
1.  Proven Rhetoric: Microcredit and Land-titling 
Muhammad Yunus and the Grameen Bank won the 2006 Nobel Peace 
Prize for “their efforts to create economic and social development from 
below.”212  Yunus, and the Grameen Bank which he founded, extended 
very small loans to groups of women in Bangladesh, lifting more than half 
of all borrowers out of poverty.213  By showing that the poor could repay 
uncollateralized loans and that a bank serving the poor could turn a profit, 
the Grameen Bank captured the imagination of the many who wanted the 
                                                                                                                          
Services Institutions Offering Remittance Services (June 4, 2004) (on file with Connecticut Law 
Review).   
211 See, e.g., Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Why the West has 
Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 217, 217 (2005) 
[hereinafter Reflections in a Distant Mirror] (noting that international interest in micro-lending “might 
seem encouraging” to “those who had always thought that the ‘First World’ could learn a few things 
from the ‘Third World’”).    
212 Ole Danbolt Mjøs, Chairman, Nor. Nobel Comm., Presentation Speech for the 2006 Nobel 
Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ 
presentation-speech.html.  
213 Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Peace Prize Laureate 2006, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2006), 
available at http://nobelpeaceprize.org/eng_lect_2006b.html.  For more on Yunus’ formation of the 
Grameen Bank and the bank’s growth, see MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-
LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 117−30 (2003).     
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poor to be able to participate in market economy without having to 
continually provide welfare payments.214  As Professor Rashmi Dyal-
Chand reports, micro-lending or microcredit, “enchanted” development 
communities, politicians, and the media.215  One reporter noted, “Yunus 
has pulled off the remarkable feat of appealing to policymakers across the 
political spectrum.  There has hardly been a murmur of dissent.  Yunus 
must be the most widely admired moneylender in history.”216   
Microcredit has been tried in a number of countries and has been the 
subject of countless academic studies, many of them critical.217  A reliance 
on women’s networks of jointly responsible borrowers is a characteristic of 
many microcredit operations, a feature seen by some as empowering 
women and by others as doing the opposite.218  Part of the attraction of 
solidarity lending practices that spread responsibility among borrowers is 
its “bottoms-up” model.219  Yet, there are reasons for concern.  First, for 
microcredit to be successful, borrowers have to be supported by a market 
for their goods, and that might not always exist.220  Additionally, 
microcredit program take-up and success differs across countries.221  
Microcredit program growth is constrained by limited donor and perhaps 
                                                                                                                          
214 See Reflections in a Distant Mirror, supra note 211, at 230 (describing support for the 
importation of the micro-lending model to U.S. inner cities by members of the Community Economic 
Development movement); see also Muhammad Yunus, Grameen Bank at a Glance (May. 2008),  
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=175 (last 
visited July 29, 2008) (providing an overview of Grameen Bank activities).     
215 Reflections in a Distant Mirror, supra note 211, at 220.  Grameen Bank microloans were even 
featured in Gerry Trudeau’s Doonesbury on May 13, 2007. The comic can be viewed at 
http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=182&Itemid=199.  For 
more on microcredit, see Kenneth Anderson, Microcredit: Fulfilling or Belying the Universalist 
Morality of Globalizing Markets?, 5 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 85 (2002).    
216 Tom Bethell, Micro Man, AM. MAG., May–June 2007, http://www.american.com/archive/ 
2007/may-june-magazine-contents/micro-man (last visited July 29, 2008).   
217 See Jonathan Morduch, The Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LIT. 1569, 1569 (1999) 
(surveying the literature and comparing different countries’ experiences).   
218 Compare Rachel Errett Figura, Note, An End to Poverty Through Microlending: An 
Examination of the Need for Credit by Poor, Rural Women and the Success of Microlending Programs, 
8 NEW ENG. INT’L & COMP. L. ANN. 157, 169−70 (2002) (“[M]icrocredit development programs have 
an empowering effect on women . . . [and] old repressive, patriarchal ways become less relevant.”), 
with Farhad Hossain, Small Loans, Big Claims, 13 DEV. IN PRACTICE 414, 414 (2003) (reporting on 
studies finding that Grameen Bank lending is associated not with empowerment of women in 
Bangladesh but with domestic abuse and gender conflict).      
219 Morduch, supra note 217, at 1570; accord Jameel Jaffer, Microfinance and the Mechanics of 
Solidarity Lending: Improving Access to Credit Through Innovations in Contract Structure, 9 J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 183, 206 (1999).  But see Michael Woolcock, Social Capital and Economic 
Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework, 27 THEORY AND SOC’Y 151, 
183−84 (1998) (contrasting the “bottom-up” nature of rotating savings and credit associations versus 
the “top-down” nature of group-based microfinance institutions such as the Grameen bank).   
For an analysis of the design components that determine the success of differing solidarity 
programs, see Denise Anthony, Cooperation in Microcredit Borrowing Groups: Identity, Sanctions, 
and Reciprocity in the Production of Collective Goods, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 496 (2005).   
220 Martha Brant, Where Credit is Due, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 17, 1997 (reporting on the concerns of 
microcredit “agnostics”).   
221 Id.   
 46 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
capital dollars.222  Most fundamentally, even in Bangladesh, Yunus’ home 
country, microcredit has only had a “modest effect on lowering aggregate 
poverty rates,” and the country “remains persistently and acutely poor.”223    
While he has yet to win a Nobel Prize, Peruvian economist Hernando 
de Soto seems destined to receive one for recognizing the power that 
granting formal rights, such as land title to the poor, could have on the 
poor.224  Through his non-profit, Instituto Libertad y Democracia, de Soto 
asserts that poor countries ought to formalize the property held by the poor 
and that doing so will enable them to “pull themselves out of poverty.”225  
Formal property has many advantages over informal property—such as the 
ability to obtain loans tied to such property226—that mean, according to de 
Soto and former U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, that “when 
governments grant people legal means to control their assets, they 
empower them to invest and plan for their future.”227  At the heart of de 
Soto’s push for land titling is the idea that “after some initial governmental 
intervention in the form of registration of property rights, the market will 
solve the market failures that prevent the poor from accumulating 
wealth.”228  Institutions ranging from The Economist to Yale University to 
                                                                                                                          
222 Mark Sappenfield & Mark Trumbull, Big Banks Find Little Loans a Nobel Winner, Too, 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 16, 2006, at 1 (noting that the shortfall in donor dollars requires the 
involvement of the capital markets in microcredit work).   
223 Howard Kargar et al., The Challenge of Community Work in a Global Economy, 34 J. SOC. & 
SOC. WELFARE 69, 77 (2007).   
224 Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact 
of Property Rights, 39 RUTGERS L.J. 59, 59–62 (2007) (noting that de Soto has already been considered 
for a Nobel Prize).  Though here I focus on land-titling, de Soto’s work more broadly pushes for 
formalization of other informal work of the poor.  See Jane Kaufman Winn, How to Make Poor 
Countries Rich and How to Enrich Our Poor, 77 IOWA L. REV. 899 (1992) (reviewing HERNANDO DE 
SOTO, THE OTHER PATH (1989)).   
225 Instituto Libertad y Democracia website, http://ild.org.pe/en/home (last visited July 29, 2008) 
(according to which the Mission of the ILD is: “To provide governments with the technical 
assistance—and the local capacity—to furnish all their citizens with the crucial legal tools to gain 
access to the market and thus pull themselves out of poverty: inclusive property systems to hold and 
leverage their assets, legal forms to organize their businesses, devices to identify themselves and 
operate in expanded markets.”).  See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY 
CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (demonstrating that an 
inability to produce capital can prevent a country from enjoying the benefits of capitalism).   
226 See DE SOTO, supra note 225, at 49–62 (listing six effects of formal property: “Fixing the 
Economic Potential of Assets,” “Integrating Dispersed Information into One System,” “Making People 
Accountable,” “Making Assets Fungible,” “Networking People,” and “Protecting Transactions”).   
227 Madeleine Albright & Hernando de Soto, Giving the Poor Their Rights, TIME., July 5, 2007, 
available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1640435,00.html.   
228 Dyal-Chand, supra note 224, at 62.  The irony should not be lost: by converting informal title, 
which the poor acquired most often by ignoring formal title (through adverse possession), into formal 
title, the poor are supposed to acquire greater ownership security.  See Christopher Woodruff, Review 
of de Soto’s The Mystery of Capital, 39 J. ECON. LIT. 1215, 1218 (2001) (asking whether such 
systematic recognition of adverse possession might not lead to an increase in invasions of property).  
By not paying attention to the uncompensated nature of the redistribution inherent in his ideas, de Soto 
opens his land-titling proposal to criticism.  See Gary D. Libecap, Book Review, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 
1166, 1168 (2001) (reviewing HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)).   
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The Cato Institute have bestowed awards upon de Soto, and de Soto and 
the ILD have been praised by world leaders ranging from Ronald Reagan 
to Vicente Fox to Kofi Annan.229  Tellingly, Bill Clinton described de 
Soto’s work as “[o]ne of the most promising anti-poverty initiatives in the 
world.”230   
Unfortunately, in many ways de Soto’s ideas regarding the power of 
land-titling to empower the poor and to in turn spur development have not 
lived up to their hype.  Titling has not opened up private credit markets to 
the poor who earlier had only informal title to their property.231  Credit 
itself is but a precondition of the larger goal of meaningful investment-
driven income made possible by the formalization of title; without such 
investment, many of the supposed advantages of titling will not 
materialize.232  And of course, despite the promise that “the key to 
prosperity lies in . . . unlocking hidden wealth that already exists,” land 
titling does not help those who did not have informal rights to property to 
begin with, therefore, disregarding the most poor.233  Although in 2001 the 
Economist supported the idea that developing countries could solve their 
poverty by following de Soto’s advice, by 2006 the magazine 
acknowledged that “although land titling is certainly a good thing, it does 
not provide a single theory of development.”234  The problem with de 
                                                                                                                          
229 See Instituto Libertad y Democracia, Awards, http://ild.org.pe/recognition/awards (listing 
awards de Soto has received); Instituto Libertad y Democracia, World Leader Recognition webpage, 
http://ild.org.pe/en/image/tid/14 (listing recognition de Soto has received).   
230 William J. Clinton, Remarks to the World Congress on Information Technology, Adelaide, 
Austl. (Feb. 27, 2002), transcript available at http://www.clintonfoundation.org/022702-ts-cf-gn-gl-aus-
ts-remarks-to-world-congress-on-information-technology.  For more on the potential of de Soto’s ideas, 
see Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the Potential to Deepen 
Democracy, 50 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761 (2006) (highlighting the role land-titling can play in deepening 
democracy, with an emphasis on Peru’s experience); Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land As an 
Intervention Against Urban Poverty in Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1109 (2004) 
(providing a review of the literature and focusing on land titling in urban areas). 
231 Erica Field & Maximo Torero, Do Property Titles Increase Credit Access Among the Urban 
Poor?  Evidence from a Nationwide Titling Program 2, 6 (March 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on 
file with author), available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/field/files/FieldTorerocs.pdf 
(reporting on lending to those who received formal property titles through a Peruvian land-titling 
program, based on a survey of 536 program participating households and 1180 households in the 
control group).    
232 Woodruff, supra note 228, at 1219; see also Jonathan Manders, Note, Sequencing Property 
Rights in the Context of Development: A Critique of the Writings of Hernando de Soto, 37 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 177, 193 (2004) (contrasting de Soto’s expectations regarding property owners’ use of their 
property with the observation that Latin American property owners “have routinely hoarded the wealth 
yielded by their property”); Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Property Rights for the Poor: 
Effects of Land Titling (Aug. 9, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at 
http://economics.uchicago.edu/pdf/Galiani_022706.pdf (finding limited effects of an example of 
Argentinean land-titling on access to credit and no effects on labor income).   
233 Jeremy Clift, Hearing the Dogs Bark: Jeremy Clift Interviews Development Guru Hernando de 
Soto, FIN. & DEV., Dec. 2003, at 8, 10.     
234 Of Property and Poverty; Development, ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2006.  But see No Title: Want 
to Make the Poor Less Poor? Give Them Proper Title to What They Own, ECONOMIST, Mar. 31, 2001 
(presenting a celebratory account of de Soto’s ideas).    
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Soto’s land-titling idea is not the idea itself, but the pervasive “notion that 
the key to progress can be found in one factor of development.”235  Despite 
de Soto’s effort to make property rights “the center of everything,” his 
“silver bullet” theory of development through land-titling strains reality.236   
2.  Concerns Regarding the Sell 
The uncritical political and intellectual acclaim microcredit and land-
titling received helped pave the way for the global development 
community’s similarly enthusiastic reaction to remittances.  Over the last 
ten years, remittances boomed, costs fell, and migrants made use of formal 
transfer mechanisms.  Remittance advocates similarly have benefited as 
opportunities to present their work, and funding for such work, have 
expanded over the same period with international organizations choosing 
to focus on remittances.  Given the powerful role remittances have on 
recipient countries and the importance of remittances for transnational 
families, only the most cynical academic would engage in “remittance 
critique,” right?  
Perhaps, but let me nevertheless explore one concern I have—the 
potential crowding-out effect of remittances.  Remittance fixation and 
cross-ideological celebration threatens to have a crowding-out effect on 
calls for other anti-poverty efforts, especially efforts that demand more 
radical change.  After all, if through remittances the poor can help 
themselves, do we really need to concern ourselves with their poverty?  In 
her study of de Soto’s work on asset formalization of the poor, Professor 
Dyal-Chand concludes by asking, “Is de Soto naïve about the complexities 
of poverty alleviation or sophisticated in his engagement with the 
Washington Consensus?”237  I have the same question regarding remittance 
advocates.   
B.  Chastened Neoliberal Thought 
Remittance advocates have succeeded to a remarkable extent in 
elevating the study and by focusing on remittances by powerful 
institutions.238  The rhetoric employed by savvy advocates arguably 
explains the reception remittances have enjoyed, but to understand that, it 
is important to know the audience.  Current law and development thinking 
                                                                                                                          
235 Manders, supra note 232, at 179 (critiquing de Soto’s proposal as relying on an overly 
simplistic view of development).   
236 Robert J. Samuelson, The Spirit of Capitalism, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 205, 208 (2001) (reviewing 
HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM SUCCEEDS IN THE WEST AND 
FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000)); accord Manders, supra note 232, at 198 (arguing that “by holding 
property rights as the key to progress rather than simply a factor in development, [de Soto] exaggerates 
their true importance”).   
237 Dyal-Chand, supra note 224, at 109.     
238 See supra notes 5–7 and accompanying text.   
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has been characterized as “chastened neoliberalism” by Professor David 
Kennedy.239  “Chastened” policy makers continue to rely upon neoliberal 
market notions to form their “baseline common sense,” but they now 
recognize that “[o]ne size does not—or need not—fit all.”240  The “retreat 
from one-size-fits-all neo-liberalism,” according to Professor Kennedy, led 
to an emphasis on understanding development through particularities, 
which has made institutions and institutionalism central.241  Professor 
Kennedy credits Amartya Sen with best articulating the normative 
perspective of the current law and development mainstream.  Sen argues 
that governments “should avoid limiting freedom—by violating human 
rights or obstructing markets—but should also aim to expand human 
freedom, by providing security and promoting the fulfillment of basic 
human needs.”242  Though this perspective seems to break new ground 
from plain vanilla neoliberalism (sometimes referred to as the Washington 
Consensus), with its sole focus on maximization of economic performance 
or efficiency,243 laissez-faire law and development ideas have not 
disappeared.   
The “softer gentler development” ideas that have coalesced into a sort 
of “muddy consensus,” as described by Professor Kennedy,244 are 
struggling to develop the intellectual tools needed to resist market-centered 
ideologies.  Thus when the World Bank incorporated institutionalism into 
its 2002 World Development Report, the focus and the potential for 
reversion was clear from the title, Building Institutions for Markets.245  As 
                                                                                                                          
239 David Kennedy, The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices, and Development Common Sense, in 
THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 95, 150–66 (David M. Trubek 
& Alvaro Santos eds., 2006) [hereinafter Political Choices].   
240 Id. at 150, 154.   
241 David Kennedy, ‘Laws and Developments,’ in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT: FACING 
COMPLEXITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17, 18 (John Hatchard & Amanda Perry-Kerraris eds., 2003) 
[hereinafter Laws and Developments].   
242 Political Choices, supra note 239, at 157.  Kennedy bases his summary, quoted above, on 
AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).  Sen’s capabilities approach was explicitly made 
the basis for the World Bank’s conception of poverty in 2000.  See Asuncion Lera St. Clair, How Can 
Human Rights Contribute to Poverty Reduction? A Philosophical Assessment of the Human 
Development Report 2000, in INTERNATIONAL POVERTY LAW: AN EMERGING DISCOURSE, supra note 
9, at 14, 21–27 (discussing Sen’s views contained in the Report); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, 
HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000, at v (2000), available at http://hdr.undp. 
org/en/media/hdr_2000_en.pdf (crediting Sen with providing the “conceptual framework for the 
Report”); U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2000/2001: ATTACKING 
POVERTY 15 (2001), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPOVERTY/Resources/ 
WDR/English-Full-Text-Report/ch1.pdf (explaining that the report’s “broader approach to deprivation, 
by giving a better characterization of the experience of poverty, increases our understanding of its 
causes”).          
243 Political Choices, supra note 239, at 129.  For a definitional overview of the Washington 
Consensus, see the Center for International Development at Harvard’s Global Trade Negotiations 
Home Page overview, http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/washington.html.   
244 Laws and Developments, supra note 241, at 19.   
245 WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2002: BUILDING INSTITUTIONS FOR MARKETS 
(2002), available at http://www.worldbank.org/wdr/2001/.  Though the 2002 report focuses on 
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the tension in the 2002 World Development Report’s focus attests, law and 
development thinking seems to be proceeding down a similar (thin?) path 
President George W. Bush walked in his 2000 Presidential campaign when 
he popularized the notion of “compassionate conservatism.”246  In 2001, 
Professor Peter Edelman asked “[d]oes compassionate conservatism have a 
heart?”247  The same question could be asked of compassionate 
neoliberalism.  According to Professor Kerry Rittich, the answer is “yes” . . 
. and “no.”   
Introducing it as “[o]ne of the most significant events in the field of 
development in recent years,” Professor Rittich describes the change in 
thinking on law and development as an “effort to incorporate social 
concerns into the mainstream agenda of market reform and economic 
development.”248  Like Professor Kennedy, Professor Rittich credits 
Amartya Sen with much of the change in thinking249 and argues the 
“inclusion of the social” has sufficiently progressed so that it “has now 
been substantially normalized within the frame of development.”250  
Professor Rittich switches gears however by noting that rhetorical changes 
need not necessarily translate into new development strategies, implicitly 
suggesting that the social may still have a ways to go before it is 
meaningfully integrated with, or changes, the “old (and enduring) 
imperative of promoting economic growth.”251  Though Sen’s suggestion 
that states should pay attention to freedom and human fulfillment served as 
intellectual fuel for rhetorically distinguishing “chastened neoliberalism” 
from earlier law and development thinking,252 Professor Rittich writes that 
“despite the inclusion of the social . . . the conception of the State’s role 
has not fundamentally shifted.”253  Professor Rittich observes, “the fact that 
the development agenda has been reformulated to include the social is 
                                                                                                                          
institutions supportive of markets, developing countries have a lengthy history of attempting to 
structure markets in ways that help the poor.  See Pranab Bardhan, Efficiency, Equity and Poverty 
Alleviation: Policy Issues in Less Developed Countries, 106 ECON. J. 1344, 1345 (1996) (“[T]he 
governments in many poor countries have heavily interfered in the market in the name of helping the 
poor.”).  
246 For sympathetic perspectives on compassionate conservatism, see MARVIN OLASKY, 
COMPASSIONATE CONSERVATISM: WHAT IT IS, WHAT IT DOES, AND HOW IT CAN TRANSFORM 
AMERICA (2000); Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, Fact Sheet: 
Compassionate Conservatism (Apr. 30, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2002/04/20020430.html.    
247 Peter Edelman, Poverty & Welfare: Does Compassionate Conservatism Have a Heart?, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 1073, 1079 (2001).   
248 Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the 
Incorporation of the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199, 199 (2004) (focusing primarily on how social 
concerns have been incorporated by international finance institutions).   
249 Id. at 202.    
250 Id. at 203.   
251 Id. at 203–04.   
252 See supra notes 238–43 and accompanying text.   
253 Rittich, supra note 248, at 234.    
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almost completely unreflected in the core legal and institutional reform 
project.”254   
1.  An Idea with a Ready Audience 
Remittances arguably fall within the space separating socially 
inclusive rhetoric and market-centered traditional neoliberal reforms, a 
positioning that, given the audience, helps explain the attention being paid 
to remittances.  Such “touchy, feely capitalism with a heart” positioning is 
shared by microcredit and land-titling.255  Politicians get excited by 
proposals that offer “the prospect of alleviating poverty while providing 
incentives to work” and that reflect a shared “general suspicion of ongoing 
subsidization.”256  By originating out of the poor and owing their power to 
the long-distance connections between separated family members, 
remittances feel socially inclusive.257  Quite literally, remittances bridge the 
North-South divide,258 efficiently delivering needed support to family 
members who rely upon income generated in more developed countries.259   
Remittance advocates seek to highlight that, in line with current 
mainstream law and development thought, remittances involve both the 
social and the economic agendas of sending and receiving countries.  
Rhetorically, remittances are interesting, and, better yet, from a political 
popularity perspective, improving on them does not seem to require a shift 
away from the old focus of ensuring a laissez-faire capitalist structure and 
preventing government interference in these familial transfers.  If Professor 
Kennedy is right that law and development is in an era of “chastened 
neoliberalism,” then remittances seem to allow policy makers to return to 
their common-sense, market-friendly approaches.260  At the risk of 
                                                                                                                          
254 Id. at 224.  
255 Madeleine Bunting, Fine Words, Flawed Ideas: Economist Hernando de Soto Is Hailed as a 
Saviour of Poor Countries.  But He Is Nothing of the Kind, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 11, 2000 
(discussing de Soto and arguing that his ideas have benefitted from “semi-hysterical spinning”).    
256 Morduch, supra note 217, at 1570 (focusing on the support microfinance has received).   
257 Microcredit enjoys this same advantage: “[m]icrocredit programs are a paradigm example of a 
trickle up approach to poverty alleviation and . . . . are extremely popular . . . [among] the development 
community.”  Celia R. Taylor, Microcredit as Model: A Critique of State/NGO Relations, 29 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 303, 317 (2002).   
258 According to Professor Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, “[t]he most important social problem facing 
humanity at the beginning of the 21st century is the yawning divide in standards of living between the 
rich nations of the global North and the poor nations of the global South.”  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
Bridging the North/South Divide: International Redistribution and Tax Competition, 26 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 371, 371 (2004).   
259 As Professor Williams writes: “Anti-poverty legal policies are not generally formulated within 
a transnational perspective . . . . It is by now clear, however, given the steady integration of the world 
economy, that poverty cannot (if it ever could) be understood, let alone contested, solely within 
national borders.”  Williams, supra note 9, at 2 (identifying the transnational aspect of poverty as one 
of two reasons for expanding the boundaries of poverty law discourse).   
260 That market driven “common sense” gives social welfare a secondary position is nothing new. 
See Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions Help 
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sounding trite, remittances as social and economic institutional policy 
allow merely “chagrined neoliberalism” to stand in for more meaningful 
socially inclusionary policies.   
Remittances seem to have notable rhetorical advantages over 
alternative development or poverty solutions: they fit with notions of 
neoliberal capitalism that emphasize a minimal role of the state and the 
power of people acting independently to improve their own situation.  
Rather than being “top-down,” with the industrialized countries providing 
direct foreign aid, remittances seem to promise that things will work out if 
the state sets up the right institutions and gets out of the way.  Such a 
limited role for the state, contained for example in this paper’s advocacy to 
restrict regulations that unduly target remittances, resonates powerfully 
given the baseline common-sense acceptance of capitalism as the primary 
development tool.261  Post-Reagan and especially post–Soviet Union, ideas 
which rely upon the power of the market—here the power of the poor to 
help themselves if given the opportunity—seem to benefit from the sense 
of inevitable improvement characteristic of societal views of capitalism.262  
Remittances can be viewed as either a transnational extension of first 
world capitalism’s benefits to distant, needy, family members or as a form 
of transformative development.  But this either/or perspective exists 
precisely because of the power that the ideology of capitalism has to erase 
the distinguishing marks of potentially divergent activities such as 
remittances, that bridge “[t]he great distance that exists between the lives 
of the poor and the abstract world of economic theory.”263  In the same 
way, the troubling effects of remittance-focused development are swept 
aside and remittance practice is characterized as a reaffirmation of 
neoliberal capitalist development.     
Remittances are a reflection of global inequality and, by being 
generated only through hardships experienced by transnational families, 
differ in significant respects from traditional development efforts focused 
on particular nations.264  Compelled by necessity rather than choice, many 
immigrants violate formal immigration laws, putting their lives at risk as 
                                                                                                                          
Developing Countries?, 1972 WIS. L. REV. 767, 781 (arguing that lawyers “will respond to market 
forces by gravitating” away from “social welfare” and towards “unity” and “industrialization”).    
261 See supra notes 154–97 and accompanying text.  
262 Land-titling is a clear example of this: de Soto’s “appeal lies in large part because he doesn’t 
challenge the status quo; he accepts capitalism is the only economic system on offer.” Bunting, supra 
note 255; see also Jeffrey D. Sachs, Twentieth-Century Political Economy: A Brief History of Global 
Capitalism, 15 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 90 (1999) (discussing the rise of global capitalism and 
dismissing the Great Depression and the rise of Hitler and Stalin as improbable historical accidents).      
263 Muhammad Yunus, Alleviating Poverty Through Technology, 282 SCI. 409, 409 (discussing 
his own recognition of this distance in Bangladesh’s 1974 famine).   
264 For an introduction to global inequality, measurement issues, and its importance, see Branko 
Milanovic, Global Income Inequality: What It Is and Why It Matters, in FLAT WORLD, BIG GAPS: 
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, GLOBALIZATION, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY 1, 1 (Jomo K.S. & Jacques 
Baudot eds., 2007).    
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they clandestinely travel north and enter a society that denies them the 
most basic of citizenship rights.265  Local “get tough on illegal 
immigration” measures force those who had begun to form a life in one of 
the states to move even though the state is itself dependent on immigrant 
labor.266  Husbands are separated from their wives and vice versa, children 
grow up without their parents or take on grave risks in traveling north to 
reunite with loved ones.267  The familial costs of separation differ across 
families and across genders, making it impossible to define a single set of 
transnational family experiences, other than perhaps a denial of what 
should be basic rights: the right to return to see a loved one when they are 
sick, the right to be able to leave work to visit family during holidays, the 
right to be seen as a contributor rather than a parasite.268  If remittances are 
going to be celebrated, rightly or wrongly, then remittance policy needs to 
account for, and hopefully diminish, these human costs.   
2.  The Alternative(s) 
What would an alternative look like?  For those who ascribe to the 
current socially inclusive orthodoxy, the alternative is indeterminate.  In 
their introduction to The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical 
Appraisal, Professors David M. Trubek and Alvaro Santos note that all but 
one of the essays presented in their collection discuss, albeit using diverse 
terminology, what they label as the “Third Moment” in law and 
development.269  The indeterminacy of the Third Moment, Professors 
Trubek and Santos explain, is a consequence of the doctrine embracing 
“broad notions” that encompass “a great range of options.”270  The 
                                                                                                                          
265 See, e.g., JIMMY BRESLIN, THE SHORT SWEET DREAM OF EDUARDO GUTIÉRREZ (2002) 
(portraying one anonymous immigrant’s hardships and eventual death from a work accident).   
266 Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Seeing Signs of Flight by Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 
2008 (discussing the effect tough immigration enforcement is having on Arizona’s economy).   
267 See, e.g., NAZARIO, supra note 111 (vividly portraying such separations and hardship through 
the story of one family).   
268 In this Article, I focus on family rather than gender-specific costs.  One could come up with 
gendered accounts of remittance effects, pointing to hardships women face when their men leave them 
for another country, and inevitably some of these observations would be true for some groups of 
transnational families.  See Sarah J. Mahler, Transnational Relationships: The Struggle to 
Communicate Across Borders, 7 IDENTITIES 583, 585 (2001) (using the fact that men can withhold 
remittance payments to punish infidelity of wives left in El Salvador and that women’s actions are 
policed by neighbors, gender does not work neutrally in transnational communication, rather it 
“exacerbates existing asymmetries between men and women”).  But given the diversity of remittance 
experiences, for example, whether typically men emigrate or women emigrate, gendered accounts are 
bound to have powerful counter-narratives, and I leave it to others to more fully explore the gender 
aspects of remittances.  
269 David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos, Introduction: The Third Moment in Law and Development 
Theory and the Emergence of a New Critical Practice, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL, supra note 239, at 1, 8 n.3 (identifying “chastened 
neoliberalism,” “incorporation of the social,” “Rule of Law II,” “post Moment,” and the development 
of the World Bank’s Comprehensive Development Framework as all reflective of a shared 
understanding that law and development thought has entered the Third Moment).      
270 Id. at 8.   
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vagueness, a priori, of Third Moment prescriptions is not unique to law 
and development; rather it is a trait common to institutional approaches.  In 
an earlier paper I explored, with regard to a particular development 
challenge, economic institutionalism’s openness to a range of alternative 
policy options.271  A central element of new institutional approaches 
important in my earlier exploration and important here is what Professor 
Elinor Ostrom observed in her seminal work on the commons, namely that 
“many solutions exist to cope with many different problems.”272   
Though not a complete list, some solutions to a few of the problems 
presented by remittances are suggested by the nature of the hardships 
transnational families face.  Countries such as the United States that rely 
on immigrants can and should change the background rules in ways that 
will close the distance between transnational family members.  
Normalizing the status of immigrants could allow remittance-sending 
immigrants to return to their homelands and their family members more 
frequently, without risking the possibility they may not be able to return to 
the United States.  Directing U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(U.S.C.I.S.) to speed up their review of immigrant petitions, and providing 
U.S.C.I.S. with additional funding to hire more employees, could help 
reunite citizens with distant family members seeking to move to the United 
States.273  Changing policies and norms to better incorporate immigrant 
workers into mainstream employment could help ensure they receive on-
the-job protections that U.S. citizens take for granted and enable 
immigrants to better take advantage of work opportunities.274  
Fundamentally, if the developed world is going to rely upon imported 
labor, such remittance senders deserve acknowledgment as contributors to 
their host country.   
                                                                                                                          
271 See Ezra Rosser, This Land Is My Land, This Land Is Your Land: Markets and Institutions for 
Economic Development on Native American Land, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 245, 278–311 (2005) (discussing a 
range of policy improvements suggested by New Institutional Economics (NIE) to the 
underdevelopment found on Indian reservations).  For more on institutional economics, see DOUGLASS 
C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990).  A recent 
law review note conducts a useful side-by-side analysis of Sen’s capacity approach and NIE, applied to 
“Rule of Law” development rhetoric.  Thom Ringer, Note, Development, Reform, and the Rule of Law: 
Some Prescriptions for a Common Understanding of the “Rule of Law” and its Place in Development 
Theory and Practice, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 178, 200–07 (2007).    
272 ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS 14 (1990).   
273 Currently, naturalization applications “may take approximately 13–15 months to process.” 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Advisory on Processing Times, U.S.C.I.S. website, 
http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.5af9bb95919f35e66f614176543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=af2
37de128ce5110VgnVCM1000004718190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=54519c7755cb9010VgnVCM10000
045f3d6a1RCRD) (last visited July 30, 2008).   
274 Recent changes in immigration law have tended to have the opposite effect, making 
immigrants less protected from unscrupulous employers.  See Raquel E. Aldana, The Subordination 
and Anti-Subordination Story of the U.S. Immigrant Experience in the 21st Century, 7 NEV. L.J. 713, 
720–22 (2007) (discussing the effect of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1996 on immigrant 
worker protections).   
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Solutions to the remittance-related challenges facing developing 
countries are in some respects the opposite of those facing developed 
countries: reducing their dependence on exporting labor.275  If developing 
countries can provide those who are destined to emigrate with the tools or 
resources they will need, such policies may be an appropriate form of 
recognizing the transnational nature of their citizenry.276  But above all 
else, developing countries must make it realistically possible for potential 
emigrants to earn a decent living in their homeland.  The circularity of such 
a proposed “solution” is obvious: adequate growth will allow families to 
stay intact and avoid the hardships that precede and run concurrently with 
most remittance sending, but such a “solution” reads as mere avoidance, 
defining away the problem.  Yet there may be room for policies that 
separate remittances from the national economy, at least for accounting 
purposes.  Doing so would help citizens better understand both the 
strengths and weaknesses of their elected leaders (a fact likely to make a 
full accounting of remittances difficult politically) and the side effects of 
remittances.  How to solve the development problem of remittance-
recipient countries is perhaps the big unanswered question,277 but imposing 
the tremendous costs of emigration and family separation on the populous 
through economic policies that in practice require the exportation of a large 
percentage of the population cannot be the development solution.   
While some degree of indeterminacy is a natural element to a law and 
development era that has moved beyond a simple one-size-fits-all 
approach, indeterminacy does not foreclose the critique that a given 
direction narrows the range of possibilities.  Remittance advocates, by 
taking advantage of the space between inclusive rhetoric and traditional 
neoliberal market approaches, use the existing limits on converting socially 
inclusive rhetoric into practice in a way that both elevates remittances 
within the current institutional structure and risks reaffirming the more 
traditional elements of those same institutions.  To prevent such capture by 
less repentant neoliberals, or by ideologically conservative members of the 
                                                                                                                          
275 Judge Posner’s concerns regarding foreign aid, that “[r]eceipt of money enables a government 
to avoid grappling with the political, social, and economic conditions (cultures, institutions) that are 
impeding economic development,” also apply to remittance dependence.  Posting of Richard Posner to 
Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/01/should_the_unit.html (Jan. 
21, 2007, 22:36 EST).   
276 One example is Mexico’s Matrícula Consular card, providing Mexican nationals with an 
identity card for use in the United States.  Secretaría de Relaciones Exterior de México, Certificado de 
Matrícula Consular, available at http://www.sre.gob.mx/servicios/consulares/certificmatricula.htm; see 
also Kathryn Lee Holloman, Note, Anti-Terrorism Banking Issues: The New Identity Crisis: USA 
PATRIOT Act Customer Identification Programs and the Matricula Consular as Primary Identity 
Verification for Mexican Nationals, 7 N.C. BANKING INST. 125 (2003) (examining the implications of 
the Patriot Act “on banks’ decisions to accept the Matricula Consular . . . as a primary form of 
identification for purposes of opening a banking account”).   
277 See, e.g., Hausmann & Rodrik, supra note 21 (exploring the mystery of El Salvador’s stagnant 
growth even with seemingly strong economic policies).     
 56 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1 
Third Moment278of the remittance phenomenon, and to provide a direction, 
if not a set prescription for future remittance work, it is best to focus once 
more on understanding remittance flows.    
C.  Capturing Love 
Remittances, collective and individual, are the most tangible 
expression of the connection between migrants and their home country.  
For El Salvador, remittances are “at the heart of claims about the 
significance of the expatriate Salvadoran community . . . .”279  “Given the 
size of the flows, the potential impact of these remittances on sending 
countries’ economic development is significant.  For this reason, sending 
countries’ governments are increasingly involved in actively maintaining 
ties to their expatriate communities.”280   
Language, symbols, and programs all seek to maintain expatriate ties 
to the Salvadoran community.  A several story concrete welcome dedicated 
to the hermano lejano who sits on the airport road; state-funded matching 
funds for collective remittances;281  a separate newspaper section in La 
Prensa Grafica dedicated to Salvadoran expatriate communities (the 
section is entitled Departmento 15—a half-serious label that transforms the 
United States into an additional region of El Salvador).  All serve as a daily 
reminder of the connection between the country and hermanos lejanos.282  
Yet, Salvadorans seem to know that their country’s development and the 
poverty in the country demands much more than what can be accomplished 
through remittances alone.283   
The U.S. government, by attempting to opportunistically characterize 
remittances as official U.S. aid,284 has highlighted the danger inherent in 
the capture of the remittance dialogue by developed countries, as well as 
the problematic way in which a remittance emphasis might diminish calls 
for more radical—meaning in this context more demanding of developed 
countries—anti-poverty measures.285  As a Washington Post editorial 
                                                                                                                          
278 Though this sounds oxymoronic given the Third Moment’s emphasis on incorporation of the 
social, what I mean by this is capture by conservatives who are comfortable manipulating the 
intellectual tools of the Third Moment. 
279 Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 187 (reporting on observations from their trip to 
El Salvador).   
280 Jones-Correa, supra note 194, at 1009.   
281 Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 202.  
282 Id.  
283 Unfortunately, this is the perspective of an outsider looking in, based on conversations during 
my many visits to El Salvador over the last five years.   
284 Editorial, Counting Aid Dollars; A Half-Successful Attempt to Improve U.S. Standing, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 16, 2006, at B06.   
285 This arguably is already occurring.  According to one law review article, “remittances benefit 
the United States economy by taking the place of taxpayer dollars in the provision of foreign aid.”  
Coffino, supra note 23, at 205–06; see also Torrisi, supra note 30, at 129–30 (using a decline in foreign 
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argued, migrant remittances, while accounting for a large percentage of the 
money flowing from the United States to developing countries, should not 
be confused with development aid.286  Though some scholars have 
“equat[ed] remittances with aid,”287 doing so diminishes the sacrifices of 
transnational families288 and exaggerates the role of sending countries in 
generating remittances.289  While immigration generally does reflect the 
better opportunities available in developed countries, remittance sending is 
a choice by migrants to send money to loved ones or to their communities, 
and this choice is often made in the face of, rather than because of, policies 
in sending countries.290  As 1974 Nobel laureate Gunnar Myrdal explained 
more generally: “As the poverty in the underdeveloped countries cannot be 
conjured away, the reader should expect in the field of aid a twist of the 
statistics so as to show aid to be larger than it really is.”291  When 
developed countries or their policy analysts inflate their aid figures using 
remittance figures, the choices of individual migrants are conflated with 
national foreign aid.292  Normally, foreign aid is determined by elected 
representatives; the fallacy of treating remittances as aid can be seen by the 
fact that remittance senders choose to spend more on personal consumption 
in the United States, and this counts against U.S. aid figures.     
Capture of the remittance phenomenon, obvious in the equating of aid 
with remittances, can occur more subtly through the incorporation of 
“remittances” into the government and non-profit bureaucracy of the 
developed nations.  The initial work done by remittance advocates has 
been largely to inform policy makers and international bodies of the scope 
of the remittance phenomenon.  By asserting that the legal community 
ought to pay attention to remittances as the economists have, this Article 
fits at the tail end of that work.  In moving beyond this initial period, it is 
                                                                                                                          
aid and simultaneous rise in remittances to argue that “remittances are de facto taking the place of 
American foreign aid in stabilizing the government and social order of El Salvador”).   
286 Editorial, supra note 284.  But see HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 53 (“Roger Ballard 
of the Centre for Applied South Asian Studies at the University of Manchester suggested—
optimistically equating remittances with aid—that migrant workers are now by far the largest suppliers 
of development aid to their communities of origin, and the Africa Foundation for Development argued 
that Africans, Asians and Latin Americans are, through their diasporas, their own biggest aid donors.”).   
287 See HOUSE OF COMMONS, supra note 65, at 53 (referring to Roger Ballard of the Centre for 
Applied South Asian Studies at the University of Manchester).   
288 Hernandez & Bibler Coutin, supra note 16, at 186.   
289 This is not to deny that there can be real autonomy benefits for remittance senders and 
recipients over “unearned” aid.  Williams, supra note 9, at 6.   
290 See, e.g., DAVID K. SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 106 (2005) 
(describing the tough choices faced by an immigrant family who “tried to send $100 every two weeks 
to their relatives in Mexico”).   
291 MYRDAL, supra note 206, at 315.   
292 See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, The “Stingy” Attack, NAT’L REV., Jan. 3, 2005 (arguing that 
remittances should be credited as a form of U.S. aid by those who critique low per capita U.S. official 
foreign aid relative to per capita aid by other developed nations).  Notably, the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) does not include remittances in its definition of aid.  
David E. Pozen, Hidden Foreign Aid, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 641, 645 (2007).   
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crucial that remittance advocates and remittance receiving countries insist 
upon a South-North perspective when looking at remittances.  Remittances 
are not uniquely a flow of money from developed Northern countries to 
their Southern neighbors.293  Even when considering only money sent by 
migrants to the United States, it is important to resist “obscuring the 
relationship between the [migrant] and the place she left behind, as well as 
the importance to her new country of that continuing relationship.”294   
Remittances should matter to both remittance-sending and remittance-
receiving countries, but are likely to matter more for the latter,295 and 
therefore, the perspective of communities in such countries should be 
heavily weighted.  Long before the global institutions based in Washington 
took an interest and before they reached the cover of The New York Times 
Sunday Magazine, countries in Latin America have been aware of 
remittances.  In some ways the first stage of remittance research has been 
about telling the North (and the international institutions headquartered in 
developed countries) what the South already knew: migrants are sending a 
lot of money home and remittances are important.   
For Latino transnational families, remittances are but one aspect of a 
complex cross-border relationship.  For many migrants, the “Latin 
American Dream” of making enough money to build a retirement home in 
their home countries has replaced the “American Dream.”  El Salvador, 
through a program, “Vivienda Cercana,” created by El Fondo Socia para la 
Vivienda, offers credit to Salvadorans living in the United States for use 
towards the purchase of a house in El Salvador.296  Unlike the United 
States, a country for which remittance outflows are a tiny fraction of the 
national economy, there are tremendous incentives for recipient countries 
to create remittance policies—including the development of remittance-
based financial products—that facilitate rather than impede the goals of 
transnational families linked through remittances.  Whether through state 
sponsored mortgage programs for migrants or through dual nationality 
policies that seek “to foster ties between expatriates and countries of 
origin” in the “hope these ties will pay off in terms of current remittances 
                                                                                                                          
293 “South-South remittance flows make up 30–45 percent of total remittances received by 
developing countries . . . .” WORLD BANK, supra note 1, at 85.   
294 Chander, supra note 95, at 1008 n.13.   
295 This can be seen in the difference in remittance awareness among the people of recipient 
countries compared to that found among people in sending countries.   
296 Lorena Baires, ¿Cómo Comprar una Casa en El Salvador?, EL SALVADOR.COM, Apr. 5, 2007, 
available at http://www.elsalvador.com/mwedh/nota/nota_completa.asp?idCat=2968&idArt=925668# 
(noting that legal residents pay a five percent down payment and undocumented Salvadorans in the 
United States pay a fifteen percent down payment); see also Sana & Massey, supra note 43, at 510–11 
(citations omitted) (“A common theme in the literature is that motivation to remit, at least partially, is 
based on the expectation of inheriting land or other wealth, yielding the concept of ‘tempered altruism’ 
or ‘enlightened self-interest,’ which posits both altruism and individual gain as motivations to remit 
when the migrant’s return is likely.”).   
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and future investments,”297 receiving countries are likely to be a more 
reliable source of pro-poor, pro-development remittance policies than 
sending countries.298   
A South-North perspective cautions against regulatory roadblocks on 
remittances.  It is beyond the scope of this Article to critique U.S. 
immigration policy or the current global limitations on the free flow of 
labor;299 however, remittance policies must be developed in a way that 
recognizes the rights of transnational families to express their love across 
national borders.  Love is perhaps the one true universal, and remittance 
regulations or policies that stand in the way of this most basic of human 
rights ought to be looked at and rejected.  Immigration to the United States 
is “a regular part of the life cycle for large numbers of men and women in 
many parts of Latin America, [and] sending money back to relatives at 
home has developed into a moral obligation.”300  The moral underpinnings 
of remittance practices must be protected against regulatory practices or 
taxes that raise the cost of sending money to loved ones.   
A South-North perspective on remittances also cautions overly 
optimistic accounts which would transform remittances into a “silver 
bullet” for the developing world.301  Undoubtedly, part of the attraction to 
remittances comes from its “bottom-up” aspect; that the South was aware 
of remittances before the North seems to add to the credibility of 
remittance driven proposals.  Politicians have not yet devised programs 
that take into account the dynamic nature of remittances, a fact strikingly 
evident in the diplomatic context.  As de luna Martinez states, “despite the 
large amount of remittances developing countries receive every year, the 
topic of remittances has not yet become an important public policy issue in 
the bilateral agenda between governments in sending and recipient 
countries.”302  Remittances are the international development community’s 
new infatuation, seeming to offer a world of possibilities.  As the newest 
“new idea” to come up from the developing world, the reception of 
                                                                                                                          
297 Jones-Correa, supra note 194, at 1008. 
298 However, much still needs to be done in this regard.  de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 20 
(“[L]ack of a bank account prevents remittances beneficiaries in developing countries from using the 
remittances funds they receive regularly to access other financial products that may help them to 
improve their living conditions, such as consumer loans, mortgages, life and non-life insurance 
products, pension plans, etc.”). 
299 See Howard F. Chang, The Economics of International Labor Migration and the Case for 
Global Distributive Justice in Liberal Political Theory, 41 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 11 (forthcoming 
Spring 2008) (“Once we recognize any moral obligation to reduce poverty abroad and to reduce global 
inequality, we must confront the significant economic harm we inflict on those we exclude under our 
restrictive immigration laws.”).   
300 Eduardo Porter, Flow of Immigrants’ Money to Latin America Surges, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 
2006, at A24 (emphasis added).   
301 As one development expert has said regarding microcredit, “[t]here is no stand-alone answer to 
poverty.”  Paul Lewis, Small Loans May Be Key To Helping Third World, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1997, 
at 4 (quoting Ben Rogaly, now a senior lecturer at the University of Sussex).   
302 de Luna Martínez, supra note 1, at 31. 
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remittances mirrors the hype surrounding microcredit and land-titling.     
Belief in the power of remittances comes as a natural product of the 
larger distrust of “top-down” development and anti-poverty solutions, but 
to understand remittances, their poverty alleviating aspects must be 
decoupled from the idea that remittances are a route to development.  For 
those with an interest in the success of Latin America, remittances seem to 
offer an escape from the policy requirements to which the region has been 
subjected.303  Import-substitute industrialization followed by financial 
austerity led to yet another top-down policy imposition of institutional 
convergence, with little deviation allowed from the mono-institutionalism 
of the North.304  By insisting on the primacy of the actions and possibilities 
of the world’s poor, remittances appear to reverse the relative position of 
the South regarding development priorities.  Developing countries, 
benefiting from the “transnational ties of [their] diasporas, especially their 
concern for their homeland,”305 seem to have a greater ability to 
independently direct their own growth.306   
Unfortunately, remittances come with potential work disincentives, 
price inflation, and limited, unproven effects on recipient-country national 
development.  Though they support the national income levels of many 
countries with large remittance inflows, growth has been in single digits 
for much of Latin America despite these inflows.  Just as microcredit and 
land-titling have not been the development solutions for countries with 
decades of experience with those ideas, so, too, have remittances failed to 
lead to sustained development.  Remittances are worthy of our attention, 
not as the path to development, but because of the important role they play 
in alleviating poverty.   
Remittances demand very little from the developed world and from 
countries in the developing world, but we should demand more from 
ourselves.  Comfortable in the knowledge that the poor can help 
themselves (albeit through personal sacrifice that affects entire families), 
more radical proposals that highlight the need to expand international 
obligations to the poor307 can be swept aside in favor of the politically 
                                                                                                                          
303 For a detailing of various global initiatives and ideas that failed to produce promised growth, 
see WILLIAM EASTERLY, THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR GROWTH 21–137 (2001) (presenting various 
“Panaceas That Failed”).   
304 See, e.g., Trubek & Santos, supra note 269, at 5–6 (describing this in terms of the First and 
Second Moment in law and development thinking).   
305 Chander, supra note 95, at 1008.   
306 Investing in education that helps emigrant earnings, making sure second-generation emigrants 
feel connected to departure countries, and facilitating diaspora investments have been advocated as a 
way for land-locked countries to develop.  PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM BILLION: WHY THE POOREST 
COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT IT 61 (2007).    
307 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 258, at 372 (identifying the key cause of the North-South divide as 
“the reluctance of people in rich democracies to support foreign aid”).   
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possible.308  Or if not swept aside, advocates of a more full recognition of 
our shared humanity and the consequent expanded duty-of-rescue 
requirements risk getting crowded out by the attention paid to “costless” 
poverty solutions that rely on the poor to help themselves.309  The irony is 
readily observed.  Transnational families demonstrate, perhaps more than 
most other relations, that people, in the words of Professor Jedediah Purdy, 
“need one another to survive, to prosper, and to flourish.”310  The attention 
economists have given remittances ought to be supplemented by attention 
by legal academics and policy makers who are only now becoming aware 
of remittances.  But in doing so, care must be given that the dynamics of 
remittances are not overstated.  Much is at stake in remittance policy; 
remittance-sending migrants are motivated primarily to make sure that the 
family members they left home survive and perhaps prosper a little bit.  
Global flourishing will require that the countries do more than not impede 
the poor from entering the market; fundamentally, global flourishing 
requires recognition that the poor should not be fighting by themselves 
what should be our war on global poverty.311   
V.  CONCLUSION 
Money sent by immigrants to their loved ones back home provides 
food and basic necessities for their families and plays a significant role in 
many Latin American economies.  The indifference of the legal 
community to remittances is surprising, not only because the growth in 
remittances over the last decade has captured the attention of the major 
development institutions, but also because remittances potentially impact 
many areas of law.  Besides the more obvious fields of law and 
                                                                                                                          
308 This is not to suggest that anti-poverty advocates disregard politics or that anti-poverty 
proposals do not take into account the political feasibility of the proposals.  See Raj M. Desai, The 
Political Economy of Poverty Reduction: Scaling Up Antipoverty Programs in the Developing World 
25 (Wolfensohn Ctr. for Dev., Working Paper 2, 2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/ 
2007/11_poverty_desai.aspx (arguing that in order for antipoverty programs to scale up, they may need 
to change their target groups slightly to gain middle class support).     
309 Costlessness is, for example, one of de Soto’s land-titling points.  He has espoused “turning 
away from foreign aid programs.”  Manders, supra note 232, at 181.  Similarly, “[a] major attraction of 
microcredit is that it can be accomplished without taxing the rich.”   Microcredit and Myth, 
STATESMAN (India), June 17, 2007.  The microcredit “fad” arguably comes “at the expense of other 
development projects” that take the “form of direct aid to poor communities.”  Polakow-Suransky, 
supra note 201.     
A more radical proposal worth considering comes from Professor Timothy A. Canova who urges 
an increase in development assistance to Mexico, a la the Marshall Plan, contrasting such a growth-
based strategy for curbing illegal immigration—termed by Professor Canova as a “Marshall Wall”— 
with closed border immigration politics.  See Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the 
Door: Mobility, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 341, 385–95 
(2007) (describing the need for such an aid plan).    
310 Jedediah Purdy, People as Resources: Recruitment and Reciprocity in the Freedom-Promoting 
Approach to Property, 56 DUKE L.J. 1047, 1092 (2007).   
311 The “war on poverty” as a concept has lost its power to motivate, but I think it is time we once 
again focus on this battlefront.   
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development and immigration law, remittances deserve consideration from 
experts in trade law, business law, family law, international human rights 
law, and tax law, to name a few.   
In this Article I introduced remittances, presenting the anti-poverty 
possibilities of these flows as well as the potential negative impacts of 
remittances on recipient countries.  How threats to remittances—from 
undue regulatory burdens to overt taxation— are dealt with going forward 
will determine whether the formalization and lower cost of remittance 
transfers characteristic of the past decade continue.   
These are important practical concerns, and ones that the paper 
explored in detail, but the well-being of recipient families and recipient 
countries in the long term will depend on how remittances fit into larger 
law and development thinking.  If remittances are called upon to assume 
too many of the development responsibilities of “chastened neoliberalism,” 
as the extent of their celebration by global institutions rightly or wrongly 
suggests, remittances will undoubtedly fall short.     
 
 
 
